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Abstract
Money laundering is a persistent threat to the economic viability of every nation.
However the intent behind this behaviour does not always converge with the
criminality of the act. A study of 395 international university students in Australia
demonstrated a prominent cultural and regional norm in South Asia to use
untraceable ‘informal’ remittance systems. Under Australian legislation, the use of a
non-compliant alternative or informal value transfer system (IVTS) is an act that
predicates the laundering of money regardless of intent. Yet in line with a clear
cultural proclivity and trust in money transfer businesses, it is evident that many
ordinary people still use these systems everyday alongside criminals and terrorists.
The data in this study highlights a trend of willingness in remittance staff to accept
student identification as valid identification for an international money transfer. The
international anti-money laundering regime is a broad-scope, top-down system,
which recommends a standard format of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing (AML/CTF) regulation for all at-risk sectors of a national
economy. However, the abuse of globally recognised monetary transfer systems is
symptomatic of the flaws in this broad approach. Australia’s Financial Intelligence
Unit AUSTRAC has recognised the need for less restrictive regulation of alternative
remittance business. Despite this fact, the regulation of the Australian alternative
remittance sector has failed to account for the environmental, cultural, and informal
heritage impact factors in this process, which has reduced the efficacy of Australia’s
AML/CTF programme. A second data set suggests that regulatory inadequacies
extend beyond the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send
untraceable money to and from Australia uninhibited. The findings of this research
conclude that there are eight barriers which inhibit AML/CTF compliance in
alternative remittance businesses.
These barriers range from cultural,
environmental, and trust based networks, to commercial and regulatory opportunism.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The regulatory nature of society and the reality of ruling decree is a direct
product of experience, and for most people a desire to create order out of chaos.
Through this direction a level of order has been reached by implementing systems of
good governance. Despite this, the control over free trade is only limited. Legitimate
trade carries with it the burden of illegal and poorly regulated transactions. This
damage manifests in every nation to varying degrees. Some of this harm is the
product of the sale of illicit substances and weapons, human trafficking, sex slavery,
corruption, and violent conflict (APG, 2011; Moore, 2001; Sullivan & Smith, 2012).
Pervasive illegal activities embody the dark side of the global economy, which
together earn approximately US$870 billion annually (UNDOC, 2012). The sinister
side of the international economy is indicative of an ongoing need for collaborative
thinking and cross-cultural problem solving to reduce or, if possible, remove the
opportunity to exploit economic systems. This work provides a partial view of the
key issues within one area of the global economy, Alternative Remittance Systems
(ARS).
The effort to combat money laundering internationally is in part a cooperative
endeavour to establish good governance. According to the United Nations (2012), a
standard of governance is judged on the transparency of its institutions. Good
governance is not a specific set of goals, instead it is any system of government that
promotes “...equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule
of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring” (ibid). Typical
characteristics of poor governance are a lack of effectiveness, illogical management,
tyranny, and a lack of accountability (Moore, 2001). Systems of governance can be
poor despite a nation’s attempt to improve transparency. Extreme poverty is linked
with poor human resources management infrastructure and underfunded public
institutions (Sachs & MacArthur, 2005). However, cases of poor governance exist
regardless of geography. In the context of anti-money laundering (AML), the
improvement of governance directly impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of
legislative regulatory action (Smith, 2011).
Prior to the global acceptance of robust regulatory governance, trade
occurred as a response to demand regardless of local or regional law. The history of
trans-oceanic trade is instructive. In the late 1600’s transatlantic slave trading was a
key source of income for pirates and the English East India Trading Company (EITC)
(Platt, 1969 p.549). During this period unlicensed colonial slavers (i.e. pirates)
purchased Madagascan slaves and sold them at neutral ports without royal consent,
(at the time) held exclusively by the EITC (ibid). This example highlights two key
features that can still be identified from a contemporary perspective. Firstly the
tendency for the trade market to meet demand regardless of the harm to society, and
secondly the propensity for traders to seek out and exploit weaknesses in economic
regulatory systems. Today these traits have manifested the many shadowy facets of
the world market which are the life blood of organised criminals and terrorists (Cook
& Smith, 2011; UNDOC, 2012; Findlay, 2008; Ridley, 2008; Irwin, Choo, & Liu,
2012).
Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) are a product of innovation and
adaptation. These systems have been the primary means of remittance over long
distances for centuries (Passas, 1999; Razavy, 2005). The most widely utilised
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systems are ‘Hundi’, (from the Sanskrit meaning ‘to collect’), and ‘Hawala’ (from the
Arabic which translates as ‘transform or change, or trust’). Others include the
Chinese ‘Flying Money’ and Colombian ‘Black Market Peso’ systems (Passas, 1999;
Perkel, 2004). After September 11 2001, the Hawala process became infamous after
it was identified as one of the systems used to fund the attacks on the World Trade
Centres (NCTAUS, 2004). Adding further to the notoriety of the Arabic system, the
US Government had the Somali al-Barakaat IVTS shut down in the aftermath of the
attacks (Passas, 2006; Cook & Smith, 2010). The reputation associated with
Hawala labelling it a system that directly funds terrorism has masked the reality of its
use. While Hawala and other IVTS have been used for illegitimate purposes, the
majority of transfers made are legally sourced and have a legitimate receiver (Cook
& Smith, 2011 a; Hammond, 2011; Razavy, 2005).
Figure 1. Common Terms: Informal Transfer Systems
Remittance and Value
Transfer Terms

Descriptive Notes

Alternative Remittance
Service (ARS)

As cited by the Financial Action Task Force.
Any form of ‘remittance system’ that is an
‘alternative’ to formal systems (FATF, 2005).

Informal Funds Transfer
(IFT)

International Monetary Fund IMF/World Bank
(2003; Razavy, 2005).
Used to describe any ‘Hawala’ style transfer that is
likely not illegal (Passas, 2003; Passas, 2006).

Informal Value Transfer
System (IVTS)

Widely cited academic term.
Any alternative transfer system dealing in the
transfer of ‘value’ or ‘funds’ (Passas, 1999; Irwin et
al., 2012).

Underground or Parallel
Banking

Negative terms based on the traditional,
anonymous, and record free operation of 'Hawala'
like systems. Implying they are shady criminal
businesses (Razavy, 2005; Borgers, 2009).

Informal Value Transfer
Mechanism/Method
(IFTM)

Used to describe processes by which value is
transferred, which are often illegal (Passas, 2003;
Passas, 2006; Rees, 2010)

Figure one displays five terms used to describe transfer systems. Two of the
three most commonly cited terms have been also been adopted by prominent
international organisations, ARS by the FATF (FATF-GAFI, 2005), and Informal
Funds Transfer by the IMF and World Bank (2003). While IVTS is widely cited in the
literature there is some debate as to which of the terms are most accurate to
describe the many faces of informal money transfer systems (Bunt, 2008; Passas,
2006; Perkel, 2004; Rees, 2011). The use of the terms ‘underground’ and ‘parallel
banking’, often used together, are pejorative terms and appear to be a product of the
notoriety associated with the aftermath of the September 11 World Trade Centre
attacks (Cook & Smith,2010; Razavy, 2005; Borgers, 2009). Nikos Passas (1999;
2003; 2006), introduces the term Informal Value Transfer Mechanism as a descriptor
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Honours Thesis

Page 9

for labelling mechanisms of value transfer. He also states that should an Informal
Value Transfer Mechanism be found it will likely involve criminal activity, due to the
changing nature of the source of value from sender to receiver. Passas also states
that it is unlikely an Informal Funds Transfer (IFT) would involve any illicit actions as
part of its normal process (ibid). The general definition of an IFT does not exclude
value transfers (Bank & World, 2003; Razavy, 2005).
There is no consensus on a definitive title for the various facets of
remittance/value transfer methods. However for the purpose of this research, the
term Alternative Remittance System, or ARS, will be used to describe a money or
value transfer service in the broadest sense (FATF-GAFI, 2010). The FATF (ibid),
states that the definition of a money or value transfer service is as follows;
A money or value transfer service refers to a financial service that accepts
cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value in one
location and pays a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary
in another location by means of a communication, message, transfer or
through a clearing network to which the money/value transfer service belongs.
Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more
intermediaries and a third party final payment. (p.13)
The above definition was outlined in the IXth Special Recommendations report,
published by the FATF, under Special Recommendation VI Alternative Remittance
Service (FATF-GAFI, 2010). This term suits this research project because it is
applicable to all forms of informal money transfer. Under the FATF recommendation
an ARS business may be run legitimately as long as it is licensed or registered to
comply with all relevant recommendations, and is subject to sanctions if it fails to
comply (FATF-GAFI, 2010 p.13-14).
Based on FATF guidelines, it is clear that Alternative Remittance Systems
should retain their rightful place in the global economy and Australia. However the
identification of multiple non-compliant remittance businesses in this research
warrants deeper analysis to identify the extent of the threat to Australia’s national
security. Therefore a purpose of this thesis is to identify and describe the key issues
that embody the weak points in international and Australian AML/CTF arrangements,
and draw on and discuss data that highlight low levels of legislative adherence in
certain ARS agencies. This thesis interrogates data collected from ARS service
providers in Australia.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
This study’s focus on adherence is a result of a widespread trend of
exploitation in alternative remittance systems. The informal nature of alternative
remittance agencies has been exploited repeatedly to launder money (Kochan, 2005
p.228; Rees, 2010 p.51-58). Despite the number of international reports supporting
this fact, the Australian Transaction and Records Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) have
stated that their main focus in this context is Western Union and Australia Post
because they conduct the majority of relevant transactions (Rees, 2010 p.58). Data
collected from fifty remittance businesses in Australia shows that the efficacy of
regulation in the ARS sector needs re-evaluation, with scheduled re-assessment.

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 10

It is estimated that hundreds of billions in funds are laundered every year
through systems that fail to keep appropriate records of their transactions
(Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002; Rees, 2010). A system that transfers value in an
informal manner is also known as an Informal Value Transfer System (Napoleoni,
2004; Passas, 1999; 2003; 2006). These systems were developed in order to allow
safe movement of wealth through high risk areas. Another was to enable a shorter
period of transfer time between provinces, allowing travellers to access funds at their
destination (ibid). The modern financial spectrum of systems that are exploited to
launder money exist in three forms; formal, alternative, and informal, with the latter
two systems at greatest risk of abuse. The formal sector includes many varieties of
financially vectored businesses which include banks, insurance companies, and
investment firms (Brown, 2009; Reuter & Truman, 2004). These businesses have
the strictest regulatory control imposed upon them because they move the most
significant amount of funds. Businesses in the formal financial sector are also more
suited to strict regulatory control as a result of the formal nature of their everyday
operation (Brown, 2009).
The global ubiquity of alternative remittance systems is linked to a number of
factors, primarily stemming from a heavy reliance on informal value transfer systems
in developing countries. Nations in Africa, Asia, and throughout the Middle East, rely
almost completely on ‘informal’ or, in a Western context, ‘alternative’ systems of
remittance (Passas, 1999). These value transfer systems used by developing
countries, (such as Hawala and Hundi), have been operating for over 100 years prior
to the existence of the first formal banking systems (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002;
Passas, 2003). Moreover these systems are trusted over and above formal systems
because developing countries are unstable, prone to conflict, and usually rife with
corruption (Cook & Smith, 2011 a; Maimbo, 2003 p.37; Rees, 2010 p.15). IVTS and
ARS systems allow developing, conflict ridden, and economically unstable countries
to gain access to much needed funds when formal systems have failed (Maimbo,
2003; Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Rees, 2010; Razavy 2005).
People in developing countries are more distrustful of Banks than people in
developed nations. Citizens in South Asia, South-East Asia, and the Middle East are
culturally and pragmatically more aligned with regional and local money agents than
with name-brand financial institutions such as transnational banking corporations.
Instead the people of Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Africa
are more likely to put faith in their local informal money agent. The strength and
acceptance of this confidence and trust is in spite of the poor record keeping and
lack of shop front or branding intrinsic to ARS (Maimbo, 2003; Razavy, 2005; Cook &
Smith, 2011 a). Therefore to compare the economic regulatory power of a
transnational corporate bank with its counterpart in the developed world, is to at least
partly acknowledge a blind assumption of trust based on brand and marketing.
Actions of this kind contradict the fundamental cultural norm of familial reliance on
local, regional and well-known money traders. Informal money agents carry
significant stature in developing regions, and should be viewed in this light (Bowers,
2009; Cook & Smith, 2011). Apart from the culture, tradition, and familial trust
associated with ARS agencies, informal money transfers provide an inexpensive and
anonymous service unavailable through any formal financial system (Masciandaro et
al., 2007 p.198-199).
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There are familial and cultural reasons behind the popularity of ARS globally.
Huntington (1997) states that as civilisations grow, the populace of every country will
spread to the point where culture, traditions, and social norms will clash and result in
conflict. This hypothesis is reflected in the globalisation of economies. Migrants from
less developed nations seek the prosperity and stability of other countries. As they
repatriate money to family members in other countries, a significant transfer of funds
takes place into regions which are often unstable and have low levels of economic
security. The informal nature of traditional ARS clashes with the highly formalised
financial systems embedded in first world economies (Huntington, 1997; Bunt, 2008;
Hammond, 2011). These formalised systems ensure a steady flow of revenue back
into each economy, in turn funding public sector maintenance and the expansion of
health systems, public roads and transport (Huntington, 1997). Huntington’s ‘Clash’
theory highlights the cultural and legal difficulties associated with extended
population growth and expansion. In the context of this research these issues may
amplify the cost of effective regulation, and likely increase the risk of money
laundering and terrorist financing through ARS as ethnic populations increase.
After September 11 2001, many significant improvements within international
economic systems were made. This was largely due to the international Anti Money
Laundering (AML) community headed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATFGAFI, 2012 b; Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.81-85). However with an ever growing list of
money laundering incidents linked to the exploitation of alternative and informal
systems, it is clear that more needs to be done to prevent money laundering and the
financing of terrorism (Bunt, 2008, Kochan, 2005 p.212-235, Rees, 2010 p.50-83).
A key barrier for law enforcement attempting to crack down on criminal
organisations and terrorist networks is a lack of cross-jurisdictional consistency in
AML/CTF legislation (Ridley, 2008; Levi & Reuter, 2006). The PATRIOT Act,
introduced in October 2001, is the pioneer of a wide-reaching and culturallyunsettling trend in the global geopolitical context of AML/CTF legislation. According
to Reuter and Truman (2004 p.45-77), the Act is not hindered by legal
inconsistencies across international borders. Specifically the act allows the US to
enter other countries and forcibly extradite, then prosecute anyone who is
reasonably suspected of committing an act that predicates or facilitates money
laundering. The Patriot Act is the most recognised AML/CTF legislation in the world.
The Act allows federal authorities to disregard state sovereignty in order to enforce
domestic United States law (ibid).
Money laundering is also closely associated with tax evasion, the punishment
for which is also inhibited by an inability for law enforcement to cross international
borders (Levi & Reuter, 2006; Irwin, Choo, & Liu, 2004). The PATRIOT Act has also
been designed to empower the US government to crack down on international tax
evasion.
This action was impossible under previous anti-money laundering
legislation. The global regulatory thinking here is for the US and other sovereign
nations to co-operate in an effort to improve the resilience of tax law internationally
(Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.66). Used to its fullest extent, the PATRIOT Act can
impact on economic security and stability greater than any other affirmative action on
breaches in tax law.
Within the Australian context, AML/CTF legislation is focussed on the
protection of Australian citizens against terrorism (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2011).
Whilst there are many other issues surrounding the global effort to combat money
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152
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laundering, the Australian anti-money laundering regulations indicate the value of
examining global remittance issues within the Australian financial sector. Australian
anti-money laundering regulatory administration is carried out by the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Australia’s primary financial
intelligence unit (FIU). This transactional oversight is carried out under the AML/CTF
Act of 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2012). AUSTRAC is empowered to
investigate any suspected breaches of Australian law with regard to the AML/CTF
Act, with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as the primary law enforcement body
(AUSTRAC, 2010).
After the enactment of the AML/CTF Act in 2006, AUSTRAC introduced a
‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) policy in order to combat the threat of money
laundering and terrorist financing. The guideline is applicable to all designated
service providers entitled Regulated Entities in Australia. Know Your Customer is a
policy framework designed to provide a ‘watching brief’ over individual customers by
examining the means and capabilities of each remitting customer on the basis of first
hand and ‘at face value’ information. The application of KYC policy is designed to
reduce the risk of money laundering and terror financing by ensuring that Regulated
Entities actively look for, and report, all suspicious transactions. In addition the
Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 legislates the mandatory reporting of
significant cash transfers. This requires a higher level of identification from
customers sending more than AUD$10,000. The Act also includes requisite
reporting requirements for wire transfers (IFTI’s), and suspicious transaction reports
(SUSTR’s) (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2011).
In Australia alternative remittance agencies have been deemed as high risk
targets for exploitation (AUSTRAC, 2011 g). However designated remittance service
providers are still only required to sight one form of primary photo identification for
transfers below AUD $10,000 (AUSTRAC, 2007 b). Primary photo identification
means a government issued license, permit, or passport (National, Commonwealth,
Foreign, or U.N). Including state, territory, or foreign government issued proof of age
cards that have a photo and signature of its owner (ibid). This definition does not
include student identification cards regardless of any similarities held with primary
photo identification. For the purpose of this research the term ‘government issued
identification’ will refer to ‘primary photo identification’ as defined under the AML/CTF
Act 2006 (Government, 2007).

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This research is significant because it addresses the issue of whether the
internationally recommended approach to regulating alternative remittance industries
is a valid one. Furthermore this research may inform the need for AUSTRAC to alter
its approach to regulation in the ARS sector by;
a) Revisiting the structure of remittance regulation.
b) Addressing the lack of training and educational resources available to
non-finance based Regulated Entities.
c) Address the lack of representation by a Peak Body in Australia’s ARS
industry.
d) Recognising the need to treat non-core remittance businesses
differently to those in which finance is the core function.
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If these issues are not addressed then the persistence of high risk unregulated
remittance activity will continue to rise, along with the trend of criminal exploitation in
Australia’s ARS sector.
This thesis is also significant for individuals, especially from ethnic
communities, who regularly make informal remittance through at-risk (i.e. noncompliant) ARS agencies. This holds greater significance in this context because
these people may be performing an every-day remittance activity which puts them at
risk of prosecution, detention, or being marked as a red flag linked to illegal or
unethical financial acts.
The study of informal transfer systems holds international significance
because it provides an understanding of regulatory issues pertaining to the
prevalence of alternative remittance sectors globally. This study highlights a paucity
of published research which validates the effectiveness of Australia's AML/CTF
regulation of the ARS sector, which is derived from international recommendations
on anti-money laundering. This study uses a small sample to gauge the state of
legislative adherence in alternative remittance businesses which highlights the need
for further research in this area. By measuring regulatory discretion in alternative
remittance, this study has put Australia's AML/CTF authorities in an informed
position so as to meet challenges facing the international community in this area.
This study is highly significant because it has helped identify businesses and
individuals who launder money. The research throws up new recommendations that
reduce legislative breaches under the AML/CTF Act of 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007;
Australia, 2012). Elements of the business community that have engaged specifically
in exploiting ARS have been further exposed. This study simultaneously underlines
the progress of AML/CTF regulations, and the capacity of measures intended to deal
with incidents of money laundering in Australia. This research is also significant
because it can be applied against domestic efforts to combat AML/CTF in other
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the US, and India.

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Australia's AML/CTF legislation does not provide for regular public review of
its effectiveness on any level, nor does it allow for progression in terms of threat
analysis or any significant community input. There is however, peer review and
formal review through the FATF, however these reviews are carried out at very
extended intervals. The first and last mutual evaluation of Australia’s AML/CTF
regime was in 2005 and lacked community input (FATF-GAFI, 2005 a; 2005 b).
Without timely review and a ‘peoples’ perspective on the efficacy of legislative
application across financial sectors, remittance legislation is subject to continued
regulatory defiance by ordinary citizens. Whilst it is important that remittance agents
comply with their regulatory obligations, it is also important that ARS patrons receive
acknowledgement of transnational remittance diversity. Overall the anti-money
laundering effort in Australia does not appear to support legislative adherence in
ARS agents because there is an issue of scale. Large value transactions come
under closer scrutiny than small-value multiple iterations. Small Value Transactions
therefore easily fit into the standard format for most laundering transactions. Since
they are not easily detected, these transactions pose a greater threat than larger
transactions which encounter more deliberate and obvious scrutiny. Layering,
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placement and integration remain the three main stages in standard money
laundering techniques (Choo, 2008 p.3; Irwin et al., 2012).

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.4.1 Principal Question:
To what extent are alternative remittance agencies upholding customer
identification standards when transferring and receiving funds?
This question is drawn from a need to understand the state of adherence to
regulatory identification standards in alternative remittance agencies. For example if
an agent fails to identify their customer then the entire system built to manage the
risks of money laundering and terrorism financing have failed. In order to ensure
that Australia enjoys reduced risk from incidents of terrorism, and organised crime is
not given free reign, the AML/CTF legislation and associated regulations must be
upheld.

1.4.2 Supporting Question:
What are the significant barriers to legislative adherence in ARS?
Prior to the drive to step up regulatory control after September 11, some ARS
systems operated without account, transaction records, and the need to implement
KYC policy. Furthermore, the current regulation of the Australian ARS industry does
not appear to ensure an appropriate level of knowledge or understanding, regarding
the need for an effective and progressive risk management plan. If ARS agents are
not adhering to legislated AML/CTF regulations then the influence of their past
informal behaviour may be a factor of influence in dis-incentivising others to comply
with anti-money laundering legislation. The results of this enquiry will afford an
understanding of the likely reasons for non-compliance in Australian money transfer
agencies.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
ADI: Authorised Deposit-taking Institution (AUSTRAC, 2007).
AFP member: a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
Agency: a Department of the Commonwealth, State or Territory, with reference to
the term designated agency.
Alternative Remittance: An alternative form of cash or value transfer which is
provided outside of regulated formal banking systems.
AML/CTF Rules: Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
AML/CTF: Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing.
ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
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ASIO Minister: the Minister responsible for administering the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (AUSTRAC, 2007).
AUSTRAC: Australian Transaction Records Analysis Centre; Australia’s frontline
AML/ CTF agency.
Australian account an account held in Australia and relates to the definition of
Australia (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Australian government body: the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an
agency or authority of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Black money: Funds gained through the process of money laundering, and money
that is attained through black market enterprise (Kochan, 2005 p.289).
Civil penalty order: an order whereby the Federal Court may order a person to pay
the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Commercial goods carrier: a person who, in the normal course of business carries
goods or mail for reward (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Commercial passenger carrier: a person who, in the normal course of business
carries passengers for reward (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Compliance record: a compliance record is one that relates to the obligations of the
reporting entity under the Australian AML/CTF Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Correspondent Banking: a relationship for the provision of banking services by one
financial institution to another where the financial institutions are in different countries
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
Designated Agency: Federal, State and Territory agencies that have access to
AUSTRAC information (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Designated business group: An AUSTRAC authenticated business entitled to
share customer identity information, have a joint AML/CTF program, lodge group
compliance reports, and discharge various record keeping obligations (AUSTRAC,
2007).
Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions (DFNBP) - Non-financial
businesses that are designated by AUSTRAC as at risk of being victim to and/or
facilitating money laundering and terrorism financing. DFNBP’s include lawyers, realestate businesses, casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones, notaries,
accountants, and trust and company service providers
Designated Remittance Service: A regulated remittance business which is
authorised by AUSTRAC to conduct money and value transfers (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Designated Service: A financial service that must be registered with AUSTRAC in
order to ensure regulatory oversight to prevent the laundering of money or terrorism
financing (Australia, 2012).
Dirty Money: Money that is sourced from criminal activity and is not yet laundered,
see also ‘Black Money’.
DKYC Policy: don’t know your customer policy.
Director-General of Security: the Director-General of Security holding office under
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (AUSTRAC, 2007).
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Efficacy: Formal term for effectiveness; the suitability to generate an intended effect.
False customer name: any name by which a person is not commonly known
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
FATF-GAFI: Financial Action Task Force.
FATF Recommendations: the Recommendations and Special Recommendations
as adopted by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) at its
plenary and special plenary meetings on 20 June 2003, 31 October 2001 and 20-22
October 2004 (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Financial institution: an ADI bank, building society or credit union and any person
specified in AML/CTF Rules (AUSTRAC, 2007).
FIU: A Financial Intelligence Unit that collects financial data for the purpose of
detecting instances of money laundering and terrorism financing. An FIU is a vital
part of a nations AML regime, enabling law enforcement to take effective action to
charge and convict offenders who commit crimes that predicate money laundering.
Intercepting and reclaiming illegitimate funds and asset’s that would otherwise never
be detected (Levi, 2002).
Financing of Terrorism: An act that provides financial support to a registered
terrorist organisation, whether through negligence, reckless action and/or inaction, or
intentional criminal conduct (Australia, 2012).
Financing of terrorism offence: an offence against section 102.6 (getting funds to,
from or for a terrorist organisation), and Division 103 (Financing terrorism) of the
Criminal Code. Also an offence against sections 20 (dealing with freezable assets)
and 21 (giving an asset to a proscribed person or entity), of the Charter of the United
Nations Act 1945 (CotUNA), and offences in a State, Territory or foreign country
which correspond to those offences (AUSTRAC, 2007).
FSRB: FATF Styled Regional Bodies those sub-national organisations that emulate
the FATF model on a regional basis (Jensen & Png, 2011).
Governance: The act of running a state or nation in a way that encourages
“...equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in
a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring” (United Nations, 2012).
Governance, Poor: The antithesis of governance. Management of a nation that is;
incompetent, illogical, tyrannical, unaccountable, inefficient, and ineffective (Moore,
2001 p.386).
Hawala: A familial based informal remittance system that is also known as
underground or parallel banking. Originally created in the Middle East, Hawala
(meaning ‘trust’ in Arabic) and its relatives, like the Indian based ‘Hundi’ system,
were born out of a lack of formal banking infrastructure.
Informal Remittance: A remittance system that is not regulated or monitored, often
operating out of direct view of the public, and to a specific ethnic customer base.
IGIS: Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, IGIS is a designated agency
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
INGO: international non-government organisation
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Integration: The third step in a standard money laundering act. The once laundered
money is further disguised by through ‘integration’ with a legitimate business (Choo,
2008; Irwin et al., 2012).
KYC (Know Your Customer): the identification policy implemented in reporting
entities (RE) whereby an appropriate level of identification must be provided by all
customers and recorded in order to legally transfer funds through a designated
remittance service.
Layering: The second step in standard money laundering modus operandi. This
step involves ‘layering’ illegitimate funds into and through legitimate systems,
generally in smaller amounts, to hide the origins of the funds. The semi-clean
money is then collected prior to ‘integration’ (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012).
Money laundering (ML): The act of processing illegitimately gained funds in order
to hide their origin and pass that money off as legitimate (Kochan, 2005 p.289). Any
conduct that amounts to offences against Division 400 of the Criminal Code or
corresponding State or Territory or foreign country offences (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Money Service Businesses: A term used by the FATF and AUSTRAC to describe
businesses in the industry of sending money, also known as an Alternative
Remittance System.
Penalty unit: a penalty unit under section 4AA Crimes Act 1914 is worth $110
(AUSTRAC, 2007).
Physical currency: all coins and printed money that are designated as legal tender
and circulate as and are customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in
the country of issue (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Placement: This is the first step of the standard three step process for laundering
money. It refers to the introduction of illegitimate funds to the formal economy prior
to ‘layering’ (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012).
Predicate Offence: An offence which precedes money laundering (i.e. drug
trafficking, human trafficking, tax evasion etc)
Primary photographic identification document means any of the following:






National or International Drivers License.
A passport issued by the Commonwealth.
International passport issued by foreign government or U.N.
Australian government issued national proof of age card with photo and
signature.
A national identity card issued by foreign government or U.N. with a
photograph and signature (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).

Primary non-photographic identification document means any of the following:






Birth certificate or birth extract.
Citizenship certificate issued by the Commonwealth.
Citizenship certificate issued by a foreign government.
Birth certificate issued by a foreign government.
Pension card issued by Centrelink (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).
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Promissory note: an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to
another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay a sum of money on demand or at a
fixed or determinable future time (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Regulated Entities: a collective term used to refer to the entities AUSTRAC
regulates, including both ‘cash dealers’ (under the FTR Act) and ‘reporting entities’
(under the AML/CTF Act) (AUSTRAC, 2011 g).
Reporting Entity: any registered and regulated remittance service provider that is
monitored by AUSTRAC (also see Regulated Entities).
Remittance: The act of transferring and/or converting value and/or funds.
SCTR: significant cash transaction report: submitted to AUSTRAC under the FTR
Act, in respect of a currency (coin or paper money) transaction involving AUD
$10,000 or more (or the foreign equivalent) (AUSTRAC, 2011 g).
Small Value Transaction: SVT, any remittance under $500 in value.
Suitable: Able to generate an intended effect (Reinsch et al., 2004)
Stored value card: a portable device that can store monetary value other than in
physical currency form (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Taxation law: the term is defined to have the same meaning as in the Taxation
Administration Act 1953 (TA Act) (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Transfer: any act or thing that may reasonably be regarded as the economic
equivalent of transfer. This extended definition is to put beyond doubt that the term
covers alternative remittance arrangements where no money or property actually
changes hands (AUSTRAC, 2007).
Wire Transfer Remittance Service: also known as a telegraphic transfer, a wire
transfer remittance service refers to a business that transfers funds locally and
internationally using a formal and regulated wire transfer system.
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CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Organised crime and terrorism flourish in countries with poor governance. As
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ (1997) theory has continued to play out, the
influence of poor governance has amplified criminal opportunities as the world’s
cultures collide. The events of September 11, 2001 were a good example of the
significant impact poor governance can have on global economic security (NCTAUS,
2004). The attacks on the World Trade Centre towers activated a global push to
combat terrorism on all fronts, including the methods by which it is financed. Prior to
this event, the act of money laundering was mainly viewed as a tool to evade tax and
clean the proceeds of crime (Levi & Reuter, 2006). The investigation into the
September 11 attacks showed that along with formal financial systems, alternative
systems such as Western Union and Hawala were also key sources of finance
(NCTAUS, 2004). As a result action was taken to regulate informal systems like
Hawala and Hundi, and increase regulatory requirements within ARS internationally
(Reuter & Truman, 2004). Despite this, the exploitation of ARS has perpetuated,
and informal remittance systems continue to operate illegally (Passas, 2003; 2006;
Razavy, 2005; Rees, 2010).
The Australian AML/CTF regulatory administrator AUSTRAC (in combination
with the Australian Federal Police) is responsible for ensuring compliance in all
Regulated Entities; this includes ARS agencies (AUSTRAC, 2007). Regulation of
ARS in Australia is legislated under the AML/CTF Act of 2006 (Australia, 2012). This
legal bill has applied a significant level of pressure to the average ARS agency,
especially in terms of the need for technical knowledge and cost (Geary, 2009).
Regulation of this type is insufficient to inhibit the risk of money laundering in ARS
(Passas, 2006; Rees, 2010; Reuter & Truman, 2004). Ordinary citizens are more
concerned with social and community-based transactional frameworks than
legislative compliance.
The informal, cultural, and familial trust intrinsic to ARS and informal systems
is attractive to citizens that originate in countries throughout Asia, the Middle East,
and Africa. The common ground held between ordinary citizens, organised
criminals, and terrorists, complicates the illegality of unregulated remittance
alternatives (Cook & Smith, 2011 a). In order to effectively reduce the risk of money
laundering, support for regulatory measures must take into account the eight barriers
to compliance that persist as influential hallmarks of many centuries of informal
money transfer business.

2.2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING TERRORISM
Money laundering is an act carried out to hide the origin of criminally sourced
funds, property, or valuable assets (Levi & Reuter, 2006). Hence the nature of the
act makes it inherently difficult to measure. Despite this it is estimated that a total of
USD$870 billion in dirty money is earned annually through criminal enterprise
(UNDOC, 2012). Moreover approximately USD$150-$300 billion is laundered
through informal remittance systems annually (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002 p.2;
Rees, 2010). This level of unchecked wealth is a significant threat to international
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security because in comparison very little funds are needed to carry out an effective
terror attack (Cook & Smith, 2010; NCTAUS, 2004).
Combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism is a challenge
which incurs a significant cost to society. An impediment to this effort is the lack of
broad access to accurate quantitative data, which would serve to better inform
frontline stakeholders of a level of efficacy in terms of global anti-money laundering
regulation (Levi & Reuter, 2006). This is due to the confidential nature of financial
transactions which restricts access to anti-money laundering data sets (Verhage,
2010). The international community is heavily reliant on the Financial Action Task
Force to inform best practice in this area. The FATF has established 49
recommendations intended to direct best practice standards of AML/CTF regulatory
governance (FATF-GAFI, 2012). Despite the existence and support for this
standard, not all countries are willing or able to implement effective changes (Moore,
2001). This is often due to economic restrictions and poor governance (ibid).
Lacking holistic implementation of sound economic policy and governance, the
international AML/CTF effort is consistently undermined by transnational organised
crime and terrorist groups.

2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EFFORT
There are three dimensions to the global anti-money laundering system.
According to Reuter and Truman (2004), these are:
a) A framework for building effective anti-money laundering systems,
b) An effective legislative and law enforcement base, and
c) A goals and compliance/cost reduction-focussed relationship between
private and public sectors. (p.45)
These dimensions are represented by a number of international systems
supported and monitored by global NGO’s and inter-governmental bodies such as
the FATF, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. The impetus for effective
legal and enforcement processes, as well as the international AML framework, is
built of systems supported by these bodies (and others) which aim to implement the
40+9 recommendations and promote good governance (FATF, 2012; IMF, 2011;
Schott, 2006). The last dimension of the anti-money laundering effort is highly
important because it provides the theoretical and logical grounding for effectiveness.
Such efficacy may be beyond what is possible through mere oversight and direction
of third parties and a willing government. Without the incentive to operate outside
regulatory oversight being significantly inferior to the benefits of compliance, holistic
support for anti-money laundering regulations is very unlikely to take hold (Reuter &
Truman, 2004). In other words the positive outcomes of regulation need to outweigh
the added cost.
The discourse on international anti-money laundering, consistently refers to
the system as being a ‘regime’ (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006;
Passas, 2003; 2006; Irwin et al. 2012). According to Kern Alexander (1993), an
international regime is defined as; “....a system of norms, standards, procedures,
institutions and rules of conduct that constrain and shape state behaviour in a
particular issue area” (p.231). For Kern, regimes can be formal or informal and
cover all legal obligations. He posits that the purpose of an ‘international regime’
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(Alexander, 1993): “....is to regulate and control certain transnational relations and
activities by establishing international procedures, rules and institutions” (p.231).
Kern’s definition accurately describes the global anti-money laundering system. For
the purpose of this research the international anti-money laundering effort or system
may also be referred to as a ‘regime’.
Figure 2. Two Pillars of the International Anti-Money Laundering Regime
Pillar Levels

Prevention

Enforcement

Formal
Treatment

Sanctions

Confiscation

Principle
Measures

Regulation and
Supervision

Prosecution and
Punishment

Intermediate
Level

Reporting

Investigation

Foundation
Level

Customer Due
Diligence

Predicate Crimes

Fig 2. (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006)
There are two main avenues through which the international anti-money
laundering challenge is tackled; prevention and enforcement (see Figure two). This
table is designed in the form of pillars to represent the basic structure of the
international AML/CTF regime. The foundation of the pillar-based regime structure is
at the foot of the table representing the first line of defence against money
laundering. A step up each pillar represents an increasingly formal mechanism
designed to reinforce the previous step (Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.46-48).
The prevention pillar represents actions aimed at creating a deterrent for
criminals that would exploit individuals and institutions to launder illegitimate funds
(Reuter & Truman, 2004). Implementing sanctions on people and organisations
prevents the propagation of criminal and terrorist activity. Sanctions generally take
the form of major fines and are enacted upon detection of gross or persistent noncompliance with AML/CTF regulations and laws (ibid). Taking steps to regulate and
supervise financial institutions, non-financial businesses, and activities is a vital part
of inhibiting money laundering in a holistic manner (Levi & Reuter, 2006). Ensuring
the recording and reporting of all transactions, including suspicious transaction
(SUSTR) activity, is of high importance in order to ensure that acts of money
laundering and terrorism financing are detected in a timely manner. These
measures, when combined with effective Customer Due Diligence (i.e. the
appropriate and diligent identification of all customers that use designated services),
serves as an influential deterrent for service providers and criminals alike (ibid).
The enforcement pillar, outlined in Figure three, is divided into four sections
that cover the reactive legal measures employed to inhibit money laundering. These
are;
a) Confiscation
b) Prosecution and Punishment
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c) Investigation
d) Predicate Crimes
The effectiveness of law enforcement is reliant on the clarity of AML/CTF law
in every jurisdiction. The skills, experience, and resources available to enforcement
authorities also have a significant impact on the efficacy of anti-money laundering
regulation (Reuter & Levi, 2006). It is important to criminalise predicate offences
using clear and internationally accepted definitions, in order to ensure the efficacy of
the global anti-money laundering system (Ridley, 2008). Furthermore, authorities
must be capable of confiscating funds that are found to be the product of illegitimate
activity after first being blocked or seized during an investigation (Levi & Gilmore,
2003). These four levels of enforcement represent the minimum capability required
for an effective AML/CTF system (Reuter & Truman, 2004).
A vital component of the global anti-money laundering programme is the
creation and support of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU’s) (Jensen, 2008). An FIU is
an organisation that collects information and reports from relevant entities, and
conducts in depth analysis to detect instances of money laundering (ibid). The
regulations under which an FIU functions should engage the agency in two ways
(Masciandaro, 2005). First it acts as a risk management tool and deterrent for noncompliance, and secondly as a device to aid law enforcement to uphold AML/CTF
law, although this is not the case for all FIU’s (ibid). According to Walters et al.
(2011) and Schott (2006), there are four different variations on financial intelligence
units. These are;
a) Administrative
b) Law Enforcement
c) Judicial or Prosecutorial
d) Hybrid
The Australian financial intelligence unit ‘AUSTRAC’ is an Administrative agency
which functions as a support mechanism for law enforcement (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).
An ‘Administrative’ FIU is well suited to sharing resources internationally, but
generally lacks any power to take immediate action to inhibit detected instances of
money laundering. Conversely a ‘Law Enforcement’ FIU has the ability to act directly
(Schott, 2006; Walters et al., 2011). However, generally enforcement units are not
open to co-operative progression with other FIU’s internationally. Thirdly a ‘Judicial
or Prosecutorial’ unit is highly independent and generally free of political influence.
Yet this type of FIU may also be viewed as an extension of law enforcement and
may face challenges interacting with other FIU’s (Schott, 2006; Walters et al., 2011).
Examples of where administrative financial intelligence units can be found
include Belgium, France and the United States. Examples of countries with ‘Law
Enforcement’ units include Germany, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and
Singapore (Walters et al., 2011). A ‘Hybrid’ style FIU is a mix of any of the three
previously discussed categories (ibid). The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units (see Figure four), provides useful services to equip new FIU’s with the skills
and knowledge to effectively detect and deter money laundering, and a forum for the
sharing of information and experience, to progressively improve FIU’s globally
(Egmont, 2012; Schott, 2006).
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One of the key challenges facing an anti-money laundering programme is the
extent to which regulations require information to be gathered by a financial
intelligence unit (Walters et al., 2011). For example, in the US suspicious
transactions reports (SUSTR’s) are only required to be reported if above USD$2000,
whereas in Australia all transactions and suspicious transactions reports are required
to be reported and sent to AUSTRAC regardless of the amount (ibid). For Australia
the challenge of dealing with information overload, amplified by defensive over
reporting, does not seem to be a concern (Rees, 2010). In contrast the US attempts
to avoid this issue, but is not alarmed by the standard mode of ‘layering’ illegal funds
that may occur in amounts just less than USD$2000 (Irwin et al., 2012; Levi &
Reuter, 2006). For both nations ‘layering’ in amounts just less than $10,000 is also a
major issue that has been overlooked (Walters, et al., 2011). Both the US and
Australia only require significant levels of identification when moving funds
amounting to more than $9,999 (ibid). These issues are fundamental cases of
where to ‘draw the line’ on obligatory reporting of transactions, where arguments to
lower or raise thresholds can be convincing on both sides.
The regulatory difficulties congruent with attaining consistent and global
implementation of anti-money laundering practices, illustrate the need for widereaching legislation. Cross jurisdictional irregularities represent key weaknesses in
global anti-money laundering action. It is clear that in order to mitigate this issue
substantially, the world’s nations would need to unite on strategic goals, and practice
good governance regardless of economic, societal and cultural barriers (Ridley,
2008; Levi & Reuter, 2006; Reuter & Truman, 2004). Although this option is likely
beyond an outcome that would be realised in the near future, it is also clear that
positive outcomes in the transnational battle against money laundering can still be
achieved. The international anti-money laundering regime was built on the creation
of the FATF in 1989 (FATF-GAFI, 2012 b). Since then many positive changes have
taken place, such as the mutual evaluations that led to the creation of the Australian
AML/CTF Act of 2006. However, the task to inhibit money laundering throughout the
global economy has not yet been completed.
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2.3.1 FATF and World Bodies
The international anti-money laundering effort is supported and directed by
many international non-government organisations (INGOs). Figure three is an
outline of the key international bodies that set standards relevant to inhibiting money
laundering. The chart also includes a brief outline of the tools they employ to inhibit
money laundering.
Figure 3. AML/CTF Organisations that Set Standards
International Body

Anti-Money Laundering Instruments

Financial Action Task Force
(FATF, 2012 a; Schott, 2006)

1. The Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering
2. Monitoring Members’ Progress
3. Reporting Money Laundering Trends and Techniques
4. The NCCT List
5. Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
6. Methodology for AML/CFT Assessments

United Nations (UN)
(Jensen & Png, 2011; Schott,
2006)

1. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988)
2. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999)
3. Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000)
4.Convention on Corruption (2003)
5. Security Council Resolution 1267 and Successors (1999)
6. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)
7. Global Programme against Money Laundering
8. The Counter Terrorism Committee

Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
(Alexander, 1993; Schott, 2006)

1. Statement of Principles on Money Laundering
2. Core Principles for Banking
3. Customer Due Diligence

The Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence
Units
(Egmont, 2012; Schott, 2006)

1. Training and exchange of employees to improve expertise
2. Promoting operational autonomy
3. Sharing knowledge to improve efficacy
4. Systemising and expanding reciprocal co-operation

International Organization of
Securities
Commissioners
(OICV-IOSCO, 2012)

1. Cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to
international regulatory standards and good governance.
2. Ensuring effective oversight and enforcement in order to protect
investors.
3. Address systemic risks.
4. Enhance investor protection and promote investor confidence in the
integrity of securities markets.
5. Share information and experience to assist the development of
markets, strengthen market infrastructure and implement appropriate
regulation.

International Association of
Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS, 2012)

1. Issues global insurance principles, standards and guidance papers.
2. Provides training and support on insurance supervision issues
3. Holds meetings and seminars for insurance supervisors.
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Of the international organisations outlined in Figure three, the United Nations
and the FATF lead global efforts in terms of anti-money laundering standards. Four
key international legal conventions have been created by the United Nations to
inhibit money laundering (Jensen & Png, 2011):
(a) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1988).
(b) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism (1999).
(c) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000)
(d) Convention on Corruption (2003).
Sanctions have also been adopted by the UN Security Council, pursuant to Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. The most notable Security Council Resolutions (SCR’s) of this
type are Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and its amendments, as well as
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (Schott, 2006), 1540(2004), 1566(2004),
and 1624 (2005). These sanctions are specifically targeted at terrorism linked
assets, and call on all member states of the UN to take effective action to inhibit the
financing of terrorism (UNDOC, 2012 a).
The Financial Action Task Force was established as an inter-governmental
organisation by the United Nations (FATF-GAFI, 2012 b). The central reason for the
creation of the FATF was to oversee the design, implementation and progression of
the 40 Recommendations first adopted in 1990 (ibid). The main goal of this
organisation is to achieve global implementation of FATF standards (FATF/OECD,
2011). The discharge of these standards in turn promotes good governance globally
and improves international legislative unity on acts that predicate money laundering
and the financing of terrorism. Moreover, in 2001 the FATF adopted nine special
recommendations specifically focussed on countering the financing of terrorism,
which together are now widely referred to as the FATF 40+9 Recommendations
(Jensen & Png, 2011). Despite the fact that the recommendations are not
international legislative instruments, they still have extensive links to the fundamental
guiding principles behind key UN Conventions and Security Council Resolutions that
relate to anti-money laundering (Stessens, 2000).
Figure 4. The 36 Members of the FATF
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Fig 4. (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c)
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The Financial Action Task Force consists of 34 member jurisdictions and two
regional organisations (see Figure four). The 36 members represent most of the
major stakeholders in the global economy (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c). The European
Commission is the representative body for the European Union as a whole, acting in
the interest of the European Union in a holistic sense (FATF-GAFI, 2012 d). Similarly
the Gulf Co-operation Council represents the various stakeholders of the Middle
East; however unlike the European Union, none of the Gulf States (i.e. Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are members of
the FATF (FATF-GAFI, 2012 f). These states are also well known as large
international hubs for informal value transfers and money laundering (Maimbo, 2003;
Maimbo & Passas, 2006). As a result the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was
established and inducted as a member of the FATF. As such the Gulf Co-operation
Council is committed to the implementation of the 40+9 Recommendations in its
region. In taking action to achieve this goal, the Gulf Co-operation Council carries
out mutual evaluations to determine the progress of AML/CTF legal and regulatory
action in the Gulf States (ibid).
Figure 5. FATF Styled Regional Action Groups on Money Laundering
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Fig 5. (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c)
In order to effectively oversee the global implementation of the FATF
standards, regions are managed by individual organisations that monitor and provide
advice (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c). These regional action groups seen in Figure five are
officially termed FATF Styled Regional Bodies. These NGO’s have been established
to provide support and oversight to nations implementing the globally accepted FATF
40+9 Recommendations (FATF-GAFI, 2012 e).

2.3.2 International Anti-Money Laundering Support Bodies
The FATF understands that the global issues with money-laundering are so
complex in structure that they require a host of support bodies, which work on a
regional and sub-regional basis (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c). These NGO’s fill the gaps in
AML/CTF interaction that would otherwise proliferate in a ‘Nation-State’ only model.
FATF Styled Regional Bodies are different from support bodies because they carry
out the duties of the FATF in a regional sense, and they are the primary mutual
evaluation organisation for their given sector (Levi & Gilmore, 2003; Jensen & Png,
2011). In contrast, support bodies often have other functions beyond the straight-

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 27

forward response required to inhibit money laundering (IMF, 2012; Schott, 2006;
CTCED, 2011; UNDOC, 2012 a).
Figure 6. Key International AML/CTF Support Bodies and Services

Anti-Money Laundering Support Bodies

Anti-Money Laundering Services Provided

International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012;
Schott, 2006)
'Macro-economic Focus'

1. Economic Policy Advice to ensure
macroeconomic stability.
2. Temporary Finance to prevent economic
collapse.
3. Technical advice and training to build economic
expertise and effective institutions.
4. Promoting international monetary cooperation.
5. Facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade.
6. Promoting foreign currency exchange stability.
7. Assisting in the establishment of multilateral
systems of payments.

World Bank
(Schott, 2006)
'Fighting World Poverty'

1. Economic Policy Advice.
2. Temporary Financial aid for developing countries.
3. Technical advice and training to build economic
expertise and effective institutions.
4. Building private and state partnerships.

Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTCED, 2011)
‘Combating Terrorism’

1. Technical Assistance.
2. Country Reports.
3. Individual state consultation on implementing
international standards on CT.
4. Organising 'special' meetings to build
relationships and communication between relevant
bodies and stakeholders.

Global Programme against Money Laundering
(UNDOC, 2012 a)

Advisory services to;
-states/jurisdictions and Financial intelligence units
Tools/field support avenues;
-Workshops/seminars
-E-Learning
-Mentor programme

There are 31 regional and international support bodies that provide services
to nations to help them implement the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (FATF-GAFI,
2012 f). Of these, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are good
representations of NGO’s which offer AML/CTF services to achieve compliance with
international financial standards, and membership status in the FATF. These
organisations grant economic and policy advice, financial aid, technical advice and
training to build economic experience and increase efficacy in key institutions (IMF,
2012; Schott, 2006).
Counter-terrorism is a critical tool in the effort to inhibit money laundering and
to protect the integrity of the global economy. At the head of the international CTF
support bodies, forged by the UN, is the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The
Counter-Terrorism Committee is run by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTCED), and is primarily tasked with providing aid to UN member states
to effectively counter terrorism (see Figure six). This includes tasks very similar to
the IMF and World Bank but instead with a direct focus on counter terrorism
(CTCED, 2011). Effective counter-terrorism measures are vital to maintaining
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international security. Central to success in counter terrorism, is the control of
financial flows to prevent the enabling of terrorist activity through financial restriction
(Irwin et al., 2012; Kochan, 2005). Therefore the ability to launder money has a
direct correlation to the threat of terror attack.
Another key support body is the Global Programme against Money
Laundering (GPML). The GPML was established in 1997 by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) (UNDOC, 2012 a). The impetus for creating
the Global Programme against Money Laundering was a mandate given to the
UNDOC as a result of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The programme was later strengthened in
1998 by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Political
Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering. As a result the GPML
special mandate was expanded beyond drug offences to include serious criminal
acts (ibid). Like the IMF and the World Bank (IMF, 2012; Schott, 2006), the GPML
assists all nations to adopt international AML/CTF standards (UNDOC, 2012 a). The
Global Programme against Money Laundering contributes to the AML/CTF effort by
providing advice to states and FIU’s as well as training, which includes e-learning
courses, workshops and seminars. The organisation also operates a mentor
programme to promote growth of knowledge, experience, and co-operative
relationships between countries (UNDOC, 2012 a). The Global Programme against
Money Laundering is a generic support organisation designed to aid all countries in
implementing and operating AML/CTF systems and regulations effectively.

2.3.3 US Legislation
The United States anti-money laundering system is used as a model by many
countries. This is because the US anti-money laundering system is regarded as the
pioneer of international AML/CTF regulation, and the US economy is significant
within the context of global trade (Reuter & Truman, 2004). The key features of the
US anti-money laundering programme are;
a) The PATRIOT Act, 2001.
b) Law Enforcement based financial intelligence unit.
c) Three separate offences for money laundering.
The PATRIOT Act was created in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Centre
and the Pentagon in 2001, to substantially increase the prevention and enforcement
power behind the United States anti-money laundering system (Congress, 2001).
This legislation is of note because it enables US law enforcement authorities to
pursue warrants to arrest offenders on foreign soil (Reuter & Truman, 2004). This
includes all predicate and money laundering offences under the PATRIOT Act (ibid).
The cross jurisdictional reach of the PATRIOT Act is representative of the
sharp end of a broader trend in the international anti-money laundering system.
According to Levi & Reuter (2006), the international anti-money laundering system
has evolved over decades into a system used by the international community as a
‘self evident’ regulatory programme. They posit that it is now taken for granted that
the prevention of predicate crimes is justification for interfering in the legal practices
and criminal justice systems of other states (Levi & Reuter, 2006 p.308). In this
regard Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCT’s) are publicly named when
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they fail to meet the standard set by the FATF (Levi & Gilmore, 2003). While the
PATRIOT Act is a more direct form of intervention that has stemmed from an earlier
culture of international financial intrusion by the US (Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.309),
the international community has followed suit in a less direct manner (Levi &
Gilmore, 2003).
The US financial intelligence agency, known as the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), is a law enforcement based financial intelligence
unit (Walters et al., 2011). FinCEN works in direct collaboration with authorities and
employs a ‘follow the money’ method for detecting financial crime and terrorism
(FinCEN, 2012). The US, like the United Kingdom (UK), has three separate offences
for money laundering. The three offences defined by US law (AIC, 2009; Congress,
2001) are:
(a) Conducting a transaction using the proceeds of crime with the intent to
disguise its origins, avoid a transaction report or commit another
offence;
(b) Transporting the proceeds of crime into, out of, or through the United
States with the intent to disguise its origins; and
(c) Conducting transactions with funds represented as the proceeds of crime.
(AIC, 2009 p.2; Congress, 2001)
The US offences are very specifically aimed at the movement of funds. Conversely
the United Kingdom offences include not only transactions but also possession of
stolen property (AIC, 2009). The US and Australia also have legislation which
makes reporting mandatory for all transactions over $10,000, commonly known as a
‘spending statute’ (AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Congress, 2001).

2.3.4 Australian Legislation
Money laundering is legislated as a criminal act under Division 400 of the
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which was added to the Criminal Code in 2003 by the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (AIC, 2009). Australia has one of the most complex
money laundering offence lists in the world, consisting of 19 separate offences
(Brown, 2009). These can be separated into two groups; funds generated by an
illegal activity, and funds used to conduct an illegal activity. Similar to United
Kingdom law, possession of stolen goods or property is a singular money laundering
offence. Under these conditions, an offence attracts a maximum penalty of 2 years
(Australia, 2005). However the other 18 offences under the ‘funds used to conduct
an illegal activity’ section are separated based on the value of assets and the intent
of the offender. Similarly punishment increases in severity based on the sum of
funds involved and the offenders’ knowledge of the funds’ origins (ibid).
Corresponding severity of punishment with the denomination of funds is set out in
bands. According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (2009), these are;
a) $1,000,000 or more;
b) $100,000 to $999,999;
c) $50,000 to $99,999;
d) $10,000 to $49,999;
e) $1,000 to $9,999;
f) Funds of any value.
In addition, there are three offences that apply to each band. Regarding which
offences apply to each case, again the knowledge of the offender and his/her
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intended use for the funds are key points of reference for the level of punishment
(Australia, 2005). In terms of prevention and regulation Australia has legislated two
key Acts, the Financial Transaction Records Act (FTR) 1988 (2011), and the Antimoney Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007;
Australia, 2012).
Businesses and organisations that provide financial services of any kind, as
defined in section six of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012), are designated
service providers. This means that any entity providing any one of the 54 different
financial services outlined in section six, must submit to regulatory oversight by
registering with AUSTRAC directly (Brown, 2009). AUSTRAC labels entities that
provide designated services collectively as Regulated Entities (RE’s) (AUSTRAC,
2012). Under the AML/CTF Act 2006, a Regulated Entity is also required to send
annual compliance reports to AUSTRAC, carry out ongoing Customer Due Diligence
(CDD), as well as implement and maintain an effective and tailored risk management
plan to reduce the risk of money laundering (AUSTRAC, 2007 b p.23-26; Australia,
2012). Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 Regulated Entities are generalised as financial
institutions that provide a designated service, however some also fit into the
following three categories;
a) Designated Business Group.
b) Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP)
c) Designated Remittance Service (DRS)
Designated Regulated Entities are service providers that have registered with
AUSTRAC and have taken immediate steps to ensure regulatory compliance under
the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012). Being a designated service provider
means you are cleared to operate that service provided AML/CTF risk management
systems and processes are ongoing. A designated business group is any
commercial group of service providers that have been authenticated as compliant by
AUSTRAC. As a result the group is entitled to share customer identity information,
have a joint AML/CTF program, lodge group compliance reports, and discharge
various record keeping obligations (AUSTRAC, 2007). According to Alistair Brown
(2009), the Regulated Entities covered by the Designated Non-Financial Businesses
and Professions term are “casinos, precious metals and stones dealers, lawyers,..
notaries, real estate agents, accountants, and trust and company service providers”
(p.10). Thirdly, a Designated Remittance Service is defined as an authorised money
or value transfer system (AUSTRAC, 2007).
In 2005, Australia’s AML/CTF regime was audited by the FATF through a
‘mutual evaluation’ process (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b). The audit found that significant
changes were required to bring Australia’s AML/CTF regime in line with international
AML/CTF standards (Brown, 2009; FATF-GAFI, 2005 b). In response to the audit
results, a year later Australia enacted The Anti-money Laundering and Counter
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Australia, 2012), which built upon
existing obligations under the Financial Transaction Records Act 1988 (Australia,
2011; Brown, 2009). The new legislation affected a significant expansion of
AUSTRAC’s regulatory remit (AIC, 2009; AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Brown, 2009).
AUSTRAC has since expanded from 154 (FATF-GAFI, 2005 a) to 294 employees
(AUSTRAC, 2012 c), and regularly collects transaction and compliance information
from over 16,000 Regulated Entities (ibid).
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Figure 7. Australian Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Outcomes
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Fig 7. (Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 2011, cited by Walters et
al. 2011 p.68)
The Australian anti-money laundering regime is unique and highly complex.
The effectiveness of Australia’s anti-money laundering system is difficult to measure
because there has been very few money laundering convictions in comparison to
other member nations, i.e. United Kingdom and Hong Kong, (AIC, 2009; Brown,
2009). This issue was also highlighted in the 2005 mutual evaluation of Australia’s
anti-money laundering programme (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b). Figure seven shows that
between 2002 and 2010 Australia dealt with 823 offenders for money laundering
related offences. Whereas according to the Australian Institute of Criminology
(2009), between February 2003 and December 2005 the United Kingdom handed
down 910 convictions and 492 custodial sentences (Harvey, 2008 cited by AIC,
2009). Figure seven suggests that anti-money laundering legislative outcomes are
on a downward trend. Furthermore the enforcement of the United Kingdom’s antimoney laundering legislation has been significantly more effective in only two years
in comparison to the outcomes achieved through the Australian anti-money
laundering system over eight years.

2.3.5 FATF Recommendations and Worldwide Compliance
The international community behind the global anti-money laundering effort
has built the system into an unrivalled international regulatory machine. According to
Levi and Reuter (2006 p.308), this is evident because unlike the early years of the
global push to implement the 40+9 recommendations, the modern international
community “now takes it for granted that the objective of preventing drug trafficking,
fraud, and terrorism entitles it to intervene in the laws and practices and criminal
justice activities of other states, particularly the less powerful ones” (p.308). The
push for worldwide compliance with the FATF 40+9 recommendations continues to
act as a collective international government would, to reduce crime and secure the
global economy.
Significant aspects of the international anti-money laundering system are the
mutual evaluations carried out by the FATF and its affiliates, using a specific method
based on the 40+9 recommendations (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b). Mutual evaluations are
carried out by the FATF, its regional bodies, and affiliated NGO’s, on a cyclical basis
to determine the efficacy of a nations anti-money laundering system (ibid). These
audits are primarily intended to provide a third party perspective for countries which
are having difficulty implementing the FATF 40+9 recommendations (Levi & Gilmore,
2003). This process is designed to induce a state of cross-jurisdictional consistency.
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The lack of which prevents the enforcement of anti-money laundering law across
international borders (Reuter & Truman, 2004).
The main focus for the FATF and the myriad of anti-money laundering support
bodies is the standard of compliance in developing and emerging nations. In the
Asia-Pacific region, 24 countries have undergone mutual evaluations since the
beginning of 2004 (Jensen & Png, 2011). These countries are part of the Asia
Development Bank and have made positive changes to their anti-money laundering
programmes as a result of the audits. Regardless, the economic and political
instability of these nations inhibits most efforts to implement and maintain economic
regulation (ibid). Jensen and Png (2011), hold that in order to effectively progress
with regard to international anti-money laundering compliance, the international
community must take into account the unique environment and cultural factors of
each developing nation. In support of this statement, Levi and Reuter (2006) posit
that in order to improve the rate of money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
inhibition, authorities must look beyond international regulations and look to other
vectors in order to move forward. This point is important because it relates to the
push for compliance in the broader ARS sector, which is an extension of the culture
and tradition of economic processes born of developing countries with ancient
cultural history (Cook & Smith, 2010; Passas, 1999; 2003; 2006). Thus authorities
that oversee the regulation of ARS businesses on a domestic level should also attain
and draw on an understanding of these factors, as the international community
should when developing and implementing standards in developing countries (Cook
& Smith, 2011 a; Jensen & Png, 2011; Passas, 2006).

2.4 MONEY LAUNDERING IN PRACTICE
Money laundering is closely linked to tax evasion, both of which are an
evolution of shadowy traits evident throughout the history of trade practice. In the
late 16th century, transatlantic slave trade between Madagascar and the new states
of America was booming. However there was illegitimate competition between the
royally licensed English East India Trading Company (EITC) and colonial pirates
(Platt, 1969 p.549). The pirates would use the EITC’s trade route to purchase slaves
and transport them to neutral American slave colonies (ibid). This meant that the
pirates were able to trade slaves without purchasing an expensive license from the
EITC. This example is evidence of two key traits seen in the global black market of
the 21st century. The first is a proclivity for trade to meet demand in spite of any
negative impact on society. The second is humanity’s persistent propensity to find
and exploit weaknesses in economic regulatory systems. Today organised criminals
and terrorists exhibit the same traits established centuries ago, only the acts are
more complex in line with the intricate structure of the global economy (Cook &
Smith, 2011; UNDOC, 2012; Findlay, 2008; Ridley, 2008; Irwin, Choo, & Liu, 2012).
Money laundering is a tool used specifically to evade tax and disguise the
origins of criminally sourced funds (Reuter & Truman, 2004). There are many forms
of highly profitable criminal activities that predicate money laundering. Such acts
include scams, a myriad of cyber crimes, fraud, identity theft, racketeering, illicit drug
and weapons trade, and human trafficking/sex slavery (APG, 2011; Sullivan & Smith,
2012). These acts undermine the stability of the global economy and have a
significant negative impact on the lives of millions of people. Some of the impact is
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realised as hardship, poverty, loss of life, damage to the environment, and corruption
(APG, 2011; Moore, 2001; Sullivan & Smith, 2012).
Phishing scams are one of the lowest risk/high profit crimes in a large list of
modern predicates to money laundering. Every year billions of dollars are lost to
phishing scams (McCombie & Pieprzyk, 2010). Phishing is a form of identity theft
that uses social engineering and fraud for financial gain. The act is very effective
due to the low standard of internet user security awareness, and it is easy to carry
out but hard to investigate and convict (Birk et al., 2007). Often a victim is sent an
email that appears to be from a popular institution i.e. Facebook or a bank,
suggesting that there is an error with their account. The victim invariably clicks a link
in the email and they are taken to a fraudulent site that, to the untrained eye, looks
legitimate. When the user types their login information on the site, their details are
stolen and sent back to the perpetrator (Microsoft, 2012).
A study conducted by Irwin et al. (2012), found key differences between the
money laundering practices of criminals and terrorists. The study analysed 146
standard money laundering and 38 terrorism financing typologies. The results of
stage one of the study suggests that criminals and terrorists have different
preferences for laundering techniques, and that using more techniques within the
layering, placement, and integration model (Choo, 2008), increases the amount of
funds that are successfully laundered. The study also found that, unlike standard
criminals, terrorists prefer to use only a few techniques which ensure high levels of
anonymity. Moreover, the denomination of funds layered into financial systems were
generally lower than the ‘spending statute’ (Walters et al., 2011), threshold of
$10,000 (Irwin et al., 2011). One of the most important findings within the study was
that the amount of money laundered by criminals and terrorists was significantly
different. Where the average maximum across the 146 standard money laundering
typologies was AUD $65.8 million, only a AUD $4.8 million average maximum was
found in terrorism financing cases across the 38 typologies. These figures have
important implications for the progression of the Australian and international antimoney laundering regime.
The profits derived from predicate crimes are dirty and are easily traced by
law enforcement to their criminal sources. So in order to disguise dirty money as
having a legitimate origin, the standard modus operandi is to take a series of three
sequential steps known as Placement, Layering, and Integration (Levi & Reuter,
2006). This process enables organised criminals to use their illegitimate funds in the
regulated economy, without fear of detection. This is the fundamental motivation for
laundering money (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al, 2012; Levi & Reuter, 2006).
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2.4.1 Money Laundering in Three Sequential Stages
Figure 8. Stages of Money Laundering
Stages of Money Laundering
Placement

Introduction of funds or asset to legitimate
financial system.

Layering

Distancing funds or asset from source origin,
whether criminal or legitimate.

Integration

Change of funds into legitimate income via
standard business or fiscal enterprise.

Fig 8. (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012; Levi & Reuter, 2006)
There are three sequential steps taken to launder illegally sourced funds and
assets (Figure eight). The first stage is the point where the funds or assets are
placed into the global economy. It is important to note that in the case of terrorism
financing, the assets or funds may be from a legitimate source (Levi & Reuter, 2004).
One example of layering with funds may be to purchase Stored Value Cards (SVC’s)
from multiple businesses online or via fax. There are many merchants who provide
this service and do not require face to face contact or provision of valid identification
to make a large purchase of SVC’s (Choo, 2008). Placement of an asset, such as a
boat or car, could be achieved simply and without identification via one of the many
online private auction sites such as eBay, if sold for under AUD $10,000 (Cook &
Smith, 2010).
To distance the funds from the origin, certain Stored Value Cards can be used
overseas and are promptly sent for retrieval at an ATM in another country. If this is
not possible then the SVC’s can be used to purchase popular goods and
repackaged, then sold domestically or sent overseas for resale (Choo, 2008; Irwin et
al., 2012). Integration is carried out differently by organised criminals as opposed to
terrorists. Criminals will seek to further legitimise and profit from their money by
investing in ordinary and legitimate enterprise or financial operations. On the other
hand, a terrorist organisation will simply distribute their funds as required to continue
their operations (Reuter & Truman, 2004).

2.6 ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEMS
Networked systems of remittance that operate on the grounds of familial
relationships and trust have been operating for centuries (Cook & Smith, 2011).
Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, these informal remittance and value
transfer systems have been a prime target for regulatory intervention as a part of the
global anti-money laundering regime (Cook & Smith, 2010). Since then the
regulated offspring of IVTS has been considered to be an 'alternative' to formal
financial systems, hence the term 'Alternative Remittance System' (ARS). However
ARS is a 'first-world centric' description for systems that have existed and operated
for many years before the birth of formal economic systems (Rees, 2011).
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Figure 9. ARS International Network 1 (Cash Pool)

Fig 9. (Keene, 2007)
Figure 10. International ARS Network 2 (Direct)

Fig 10. (Keene, 2007)
Figure 11. International ARS Network 3 (Bank and Direct)

Fig 11. (Keene, 2007)
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Common operational structures can be identified easily in ARS businesses,
some of which can use multiple banks as intermediaries or cash pools to settle
informal debts (Figures nine, ten & eleven).
Alternative remittance systems exist in many different forms however all share
a common structure with each other, which varies in complexity (Keene, 2007). The
standard operating procedure of an alternative remittance system is a transaction
between a sender in Country A and a receiver Country B. The sender in Country A
contacts the ARS agent and takes payment which includes a small fee. In a
regulated agency information is recorded about the sender and receiver, and
identification is sighted and recorded as part of the transfer process. A code is then
given to the sender who communicates it to the receiver. Meanwhile, sending agent
A contacts the disbursing agent in Country B, who in turn alerts the receiver
regarding the funds to pick up. In some cases the funds can also be delivered (Cook
& Smith, 2010; Keene, 2007; Maimbo & Passas, 2003). The key characteristic of
informal and alternative remittance systems, is that daily operations require no
physical transfer of funds. Instead an informal debt is recorded between transfer
agents and is settled at regular intervals. This can be done through cash payments
through a courier, postal orders, cheques, wire transfers, and bank transfers (Keene,
2007; Passas, 1999; Rees, 2010).
Other methods include trade settlement through the purchase of precious
stones, gold, or other valuable assets (Walters et al., 2011). ARS agents generally
have bank accounts in central locations to reduce transfer costs. Popular sites for
IVTS funds consolidation include Dubai, New York, London, Hong Kong, and
Singapore (Passas, 2003; Perkel, 2004). The legality of these processes depends
on the country in which the transfer systems are operating; these processes are not
used exclusively by illegal IVTS systems (Walters et al. 2011; Rees, 2010).
The regulation of alternative remittance systems is a task which is balanced
on a knife’s edge. This challenge is embodied by the need to impose strict control of
monetary flow to maintain security, and the necessity to allow flexibility to enable the
legitimate existence of semi-formal systems which allows progression and growth
throughout the global economy (Jensen & Png, 2011). This is a common theme
which characterises the greater majority of modern security issues in which
responses often restrict societal freedoms at times of crisis to maintain security
(Soma et al., 2004). The regulation of informal systems has not preceded the end to
security issues within the ARS community. The effort to balance security and
operational flexibility when regulating the remittances sector has left in its wake
significant weaknesses. These are flaws which continue to be exploited by
organised criminals and terrorists worldwide (Cook & Smith, 2010; 2011; 2011a).
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2.6.1 International Exploitation of ARS
The informal nature of ARS and their networks leaves them open to
exploitation from within and without. There are many cases of innocent and unaware
people responding to a Phishing email, sending money through a system like
Western Union on instruction and never hearing from that international contact
again. For example in 2010 one case of scamming through ARS exploitation
involved organised criminal groups sending phished funds out of Australia to an
intermediary in Africa. That person would then use Western Union and MoneyGram
agencies to transfer the money on to a Russian crime gang minus a fee (McCombie
& Pieprzyk, 2010). ARS transfers are difficult to track and are almost impossible to
link to a receiver, especially in countries where regulations do not require agencies
to record and keep validated information on their customers.
The Ussama El-Kurd case highlights alternate remittance exploitation from
within a business. This incident involved a money exchange franchise operating in
the UK called Bureaux de Change. According to Kochan (2005), Ussama El-Kurd
was convicted of laundering approximately £70 million of dirty money as a Bureaux
de Change franchisee. Investigator’s who gathered evidence, later used to convict
Mr El-Kurd, found that Ussama’s well oiled laundering business managed to
convince banks to convert the money for easier transfer because he understood his
business. By informing the Banks, when questioned, that he was converting funds
for a large number of exchange agencies, Ussama’s couriers were able to avoid any
unwanted suspicion. Mr El-Kurd’s share of the money that he converted and
transferred was 3.5% or approximately £3.5 million (Kochan, 2005 p.228). The
laundering and transferral of illegitimate gains can be an enticing proposition, when a
simple process can produce extraordinary results (Rees, 2010 p.51-58).
Some of the largest and most at-risk alternative remittance systems are
entirely online. The online auction site and payment system eBay/PayPal exists as
one of the world’s largest transnational informal sales platforms. It can be classified
as an alternate remittance system because the PayPal arm of the eBay Corporation
operates partially outside formal financial systems of control (Cook & Smith, 2010).
According to their 2011 annual report, eBay has over 100 million registered regular
users from almost every country in the world (eBay, 2011). The informal aspect of
the PayPal system means that any user can set up an account, and sell an item for
up to US or AUD $9,999 on eBay, without the need for validation of primary
identification (AIC, 2009; Australia, 2012). Furthermore, there is no way to
determine whether goods are sent or received. Nor is there any way to validate the
authenticity of an items’ description in comparison to what is sent, if at all (Daily Mail,
2006). The nature of the eBay/PayPal sale process effectively renders every user a
private remittance operator (eBay, 2011; Cook & Smith, 2011). This represents a
major loophole in the attempt to regulate online auction and payment systems. For
example, if a terror organisation lists an imaginary item on eBay from Australia at
AUD$9,500, and a counterpart in Pakistan was organised to purchase the item, then
the illegitimate transaction is covered by a seemingly legitimate auction (Daily Mail,
2006). This process would not require any item to be sent, the money would arrive
without arousing suspicion, and in the same way a similar process would bring funds
into Australia. The threat posed by this issue has largely been ignored due to the
enormity of the system and the task at hand (Cook & Smith, 2010).
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Figure 12. Abuse of Hawala or Hundi System into India

Fig 12. (Sharma, 2006)
The criminal use of informal systems is just one part of the threat posed by
unregulated systems (see Figure 12). The threat of terrorism is also enabled by
Hawala and Hundi agents that are unaware or willingly facilitate the laundering of
illicit funds (Passas, 1999; 2003). International cases of abuse in Hawala and Hundi
systems are abundant and well documented. In one international case a Pakistani
national, referred to as Mr. X, living in Canada pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder
money. The accused operated an unregulated Hawala business in Montreal,
Canada which made regular international transfers through a network of people and
businesses outside of the formal economy. A witness cooperating with authorities
contacted Mr. X posing as a criminal involved in high level transnational crime,
including drug trafficking and counterfeit cigarettes. Under instruction the witness
professed a desire to use Mr. X and his Hawala business to transfer the proceeds of
drug trafficking to support these criminal acts. As a result, between 2004 and 2005
Mr. X and a co-defendant Mr. Y made 10 transactions, laundering a total of USD
$828,000 (MONEYVAL & FATF/OECD, 2010).
In 2011, a US money laundering case involved the exploitation of Western
Union by the former Mayor of a town called Nogales in Arizona. Ex-Mayor Octavio
Garcia Von Borstel set up a company called Legalizaciones to cash cheques and
acquire Western Union money orders free of charge through his father’s remittance
business, called Western Cash Express (Smith, 2011). In total the ex-mayor and his
father, Octavio Garcia Suarez, defrauded Western Union of USD $618,000.
Western Union became aware of a discrepancy and carried out an investigation
which found evidence of money laundering. Western Union took action to recover
losses and subsequently won a civil law suit against the father and son. Law
enforcement were informed and as a result Von Borstel was convicted and
sentenced to three and a half years in prison with seven years probation, and his
father received two years prison with seven years probation (Smith, 2011).
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2.6.2 ARS in Australia
Australia’s ARS community is diverse and supports many ethnic communities
by providing easy access to low cost international money transfers. According to
David Rees (2010), there are five major ethnic communities in Australia which rely
heavily on ARS to send money home and abroad. These are the Filipino, Somali,
Indian, Vietnamese, and Samoan communities. The most prevalent areas for ARS
business supporting these communities are Sydney and Melbourne, with modest
numbers of ARS agencies in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia
(ibid). A survey of 395 international students in Australia also found evidence to
suggest that there is a prevalent South Asian community that makes regular use of
informal and alternative remittances (Cook & Smith, 2011 a). The study also
supports David Rees (2010), in the claim that the primary reasons behind the level of
expatriate reliance on alternative remittances in Australia are due to issues of trust
and familial ties (Cook & Smith, 2011 a; Rees, 2010).
Figure 13. Remitters Registered with AUSTRAC as of June 2011
Financial Year (Aus)

2008–09

2009–10

2010–11

Registered Remitters

5401

6,117

6,927

Change from previous
year (%)

109%

13%

13%

Fig 13. (AUSTRAC, 2011 h)
There is a steady increase in the number remitters registered with AUSTRAC
as of June 30th, 2011 (Figure 13). AUSTRAC recognises that Australia’s remittance
community is changing rapidly (AUSTRAC, 2011 h). The number of registered
remitters doubled in the 2008-09 financial year from approximately 2450 to 5410, a
109% increase. Since then each year has seen remittance business increase by
13%, coming to 6,927 by the end of June 2011 (ibid).
The Australian ARS community is characterised as dynamic, with very few
barriers to entry and exit from the sector (AUSTRAC, 2011 h). The industry is highly
progressive, and AUSTRAC witnesses regular transfers of ownership and the
frequent addition of new agents in Australia’s principal ARS networks (ibid). This
unique business community is dominated by Western Union (WU) and its affiliation
with Australia Post (Post, 2012; 2012 a). There are approximately 5000 WU
agencies in Australia (Western Union, 2010), and approximately 3,200 of them are
Australia post outlets that provide Western Union remittance services (Post, 2012 c).
The remaining WU outlets (an estimated 1,800) exist as third party remittance
providers in local convenience, money exchange, fast food stalls, and grocery stores
(Cook & Smith, 2010 p.21). Over and above the 6,527 ARS agencies which are
affiliates of larger international networks, an estimated 400 small money remittance
agencies serve specific ethnic communities around Australia (AUSTRAC, 2011 g
p.17).
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Figure 14. Australian ARS Businesses by Category
Remittance Characteristics and
Brand Examples

Remittance Service Categories
Formal Transfer Focussed

Semi-formal












Covert Non-Aligned





No secondary business goals.
Transfers only to specific countries.
(i.e. iRemit)
Transfers may be secondary to main business.
Transfers to many different countries.
Provides online services.
Operates out of a shop front.
Advertises to the public.
(i.e. WU, PayPal, MoneyGram, Ez Money Express and
UAE Exchange).
Operates out of an unlikely premise (i.e. Taxi,
Restaurant, Butcher, Ethnic Video Store, and Private
Residence).
Not Brand Affiliated.
Relies on word of mouth and familial networks instead
of advertising.
Hawala, Hundi, and Black Market Peso style operations.

Fig 14. (Based on extensive literature review)
A review of the literature on remittance business has revealed three common
categories of remittance service providers. As outlined in Figure 14, remittance
businesses can be categorised as Formal Transfer Focussed, Semi-formal, and
Covert Non-Aligned remitters. A formal transfer focussed remitter has no secondary
financial imperative within the business and in some cases will only transfer to
specific countries as their primary service is aimed at a specific expatriate
community. An Australian example of this type of remittance agency is the
Philippine transfer agency known as iRemit (2011).
A semi-formal ARS agency is likely to provide transfer services as a
secondary feature next to the main economic imperative of the business, especially
in shop-front businesses. For example, common primary services surrounding semiformal remitters in Australia include news-agencies, chemists, convenience stores,
fast food stalls, and post offices. This category of remitter may be an entirely online
service provider, will advertise to the wider public, and generally supports transfers
to a large number of countries. Branded semi-formal remittance businesses
prevalent in the Australian ARS sector include Western Union, PayPal, MoneyGram,
Ez Money Express, and UAE Exchange (Western Union, 2010; MoneyGram, 2012;
PayPal, 2012; Post, 2012 c; Ez Money Express, 2012; UAE Exchange Australia,
2012).
A covert non-aligned money transfer operation is an underground and
unregulated remittance business. This category of remitter will often operate out of
unlikely premises such as a taxi, restaurant, butcher, ethnic video store, or a private
residence. These remitters are not brand affiliated and will not advertise their
business openly; instead agents rely on word of mouth and familial networks to build
their client base. A covert non-aligned remittance agent could also be called an
‘underground banker’ (Borgers, 2009), and would likely structure their business on
the Hawala, Hundi, or Black Market Peso style IVTS (Bunt, 2008; Passas, 1999;
2003; 2006; Perkel, 2004; Sharma, 2006).
The threat of money laundering through Australia’s ARS sector is well known
to Australia’s anti-money laundering regulator AUSTRAC. Money laundering is held
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by Australia’s national security and law enforcement agencies to be one of three
‘critical’ organised crime threats (National Organised Crime Threat Assessment,
2010; 2011; cited by AUSTRAC, 2011 g p.5). The threat is hard to quantify due to
the unquantified nature of criminal activity, but estimates have been made.
According to Choo (2008, p.3), approximately AUD $2-4 billion is laundered through
the Australian economy annually. What can be quantified with a little more accuracy
is the cost of money laundering, which is estimated to be AUD $10-15 billion every
year (AUSTRAC, 2011 g p.2). Moreover in the year leading up to the end of the
2011, Australia’s registered ARS agencies supplied international funds transfer
instruction reports which totalled AUD $8.5 billion (ibid p.17). Therefore it is clear
that the significance of effective regulation and support to attain compliance in this
sector is of paramount importance to Australia’s national security.

2.6.3 The impact of Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering Regulations
on ARS Business
The regulatory requirements applied by Australia’s anti-money laundering
system to the money transfer sector are significant. Major factors include time, cost,
and knowledge/understanding. Remittance agents must meet extensive reporting
requirements; including international funds transfer instruction reports, SUSTR’s
(AUSTRAC, 2011 h), annual compliance reports (AUSTRAC, 2011 f), and Significant
Cash Transfer Reports (SCTR’s) (Australia, 2012).
The impact of lost time is also applicable to the overall cost of anti-money
laundering compliance for ARS agencies. According to AUSTRAC (2012 d), the
overall cost of regulatory processes and action is AUD $32.3 million. The
supervisory levy set out for 2012-13 is based on the total operational cost of
AUSTRAC. Under this legislation ARS agencies pay a base component fee of $300
annually and $0.01 per reported transaction (ibid). Include with this fee the time
spent reporting, carrying out risk management processes, training staff, the cost of
increased labour hours and the negative impact on income as a result of reduced
time spent with customers. All of these factors would have an impact on the
profitability of an ARS business which could lead to non-compliance or failure of the
business.
The requirement for knowledge refers to the pressure applied to ARS
businesses to create, implement, and maintain an effective risk management
portfolio in their business. This requirement is by far the most demanding of
AML/CTF obligations due to the complexity of risk management in general.
According to Joy Geary (2009), one of the major issues with non-financial Regulated
Entities attempting to implement effective AML/CTF risk management in their
businesses is a lack of historical sources. Information required to make an accurate
risk assessment include; national threat assessment reports, typology reports from
relevant NGO’s and financial intelligence units (i.e. FATF, AUSTRAC, Egmont etc.),
associated industry reports, and external consultation at significant cost (Geary,
2009). This type of information would be very difficult and time consuming to
access, and would require a greater understanding of the issues surrounding money
laundering in non-core financial businesses. As a result it is highly unlikely that a
kebab shop owner or a local news agent would spend the money or time necessary
to make an accurate, or indeed progressively reviewed, risk assessment.
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2.6.4 Exploitation of ARS in Australia
The exploitation of remittance businesses is a global norm and Australia’s
money transfer businesses have not been ignored in this trend. Every year an
estimated AUD $2-4 billion is laundered through Australia’s financial sector (Choo,
2008). It is also estimated by Masciandaro et al. (2007 p.200), that money
launderers generally take a 5 to 15% cut of the funds that they launder. While these
figures are just estimates, it is well known that organised criminality is persistent due
to the highly profitable nature of the black market (UNDOC, 2012).
A report on money transfer agencies which are suspected of profiting from
human trafficking was published on August 12th, 2012. One of the six suspected
agencies is an Afghan convenience store, known as the ‘Alamadar Superstore’,
which provides money transfer services to a local community of Afghani migrants.
According to Stewart & Maley (2012), AFP investigators believe the Alamadar
money transfer service is linked to a convicted human trafficker known as Haji Sakhi.
This people smuggler, also known as Zamin Ali, was part of an earlier criminal group
which organised and dispatched a large number of unseaworthy boats of asylum
seekers to Australia from the late 1990’s to the early 2000’s. The police believe the
three owners of the Alamadar remittance agency are relatives of Sakhi, and are
profiting from commissions on funds paid to facilitate a surge of boats arriving in
Australia (ibid).
Furthermore the same report highlights similar suspicion in another of the six
money transfer agencies under scrutiny, called the Parwaz Travel and Money
Exchange. This remittance business operates out of a store on the same street as
the Alamadar business (Stewart & Maley, 2012). Similar to the Alamadar case, the
owner Inayatullah Nauroze is the son of a convicted human trafficker, known as
Nauroze Ali or Haji Nauroze, who now works in his sons business. Last year Haji’s
exchange business in Pakistan was shut down by authorities as part of enforcement
action to halt human trafficking activity. In this case the AFP suspects Inayatullah of
organising a network of Hawala agents to launder and facilitate the transfer of funds
to bankroll passage by boat into Australia (ibid). These cases highlight suspected
trends linking remittance agencies with organised criminal activity.
Another case in Australia found two directors of a money exchange business
guilty on multiple counts of money laundering (AAP, 2007). Azeez Ansari and Haja
Ansari managed a remittance business called ‘Exchange Point’. The currency
exchange was investigated by a joint law enforcement group of five agencies which
included the Australian Federal Police and AUSTRAC. The Exchange Point
business incorporated a money transfer service and had many contacts in its global
network, with a significant number of them in Singapore. The investigation found
that the currency exchange had received over AUD $2.5 million to be layered into
specific Australian bank accounts in amounts less than $10,000. A cash pool was
also set up with money provided by Australians which was used to allow access to
cash internationally for the fund stakeholders. This was facilitated by phone calls, no
records were made, and no funds left Australia. At the conclusion of their trial and
an appeal, the Ansaris’ received prison sentences for a multitude of money
laundering offences (ibid)
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A Joint Task Force code-named ‘Gordian’ was established in May 2005
(AUSTRAC, 2011 h).
This group was tasked with investigating the key
configurations and networks used by organised criminals to launder money, evade
tax, and finance their activities. The method used to disengage criminal networks
was to target accountants, money remitters and the financial service providers
assisting the various criminal entities. The task force investigation concluded having
disrupted 16 criminal syndicates and charged 73 people with money laundering and
drug offences. This included charges against seven main suspects for conspiring to
launder AUD $93 million. The laundering of the funds was intended to be achieved
through money transfer businesses, partially to international destinations. In addition,
three suspects were sentenced in 2009 to imprisonment of up to 10 years for money
laundering and drug trafficking (ibid).
The abuse of Australia’s remittance sector is wide spread. This is supported
by a media release from AUSTRAC in 2012, which highlights five separate
enforcement actions due to non-compliance in money transfer businesses (2012 b).
The continuance of this trend is also supported by evidence of organised crime
groups targeting the alternative remittance sector in Australia to launder money.
According to AUSTRAC (2011 g), enforcement authorities have detected criminal
groups which are targeting money remittance agencies to launder the proceeds of
crime. Sources of the laundered funds, cited by AUSTRAC (2011 g), include: “...tax
fraud, drug trafficking, tobacco smuggling, people smuggling, and advance fee fraud
(such as ‘Nigerian’ scams)” (p.17). As a result Australia’s alternative remittance
sector is at significant risk of criminal exploitation on an ongoing basis, and cases of
non-compliance with AML/CTF regulations and criminal exploitation are likely to
continue to be discovered.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines how the research was structured in terms of the methodological
approach to data collection. It also outlines the research based framework that
provided the focus and direction for the study. The chapter also discusses details of
the data analysis process used to answer the principal and supporting questions.

3.2 QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE APPROACH
This research project made use of a mixed-methods approach as the most
appropriate way to provide a suitable framework for data sets collected in this study.
This in turn enabled effective analysis of the results, and provided for in-depth
discussion and conclusions derived from the research data. This study used
quantitative and qualitative research methods.
Quantitative researchers seek to test impartial hypotheses through an
examination of the link between variables. This approach to research gives
emphasis to precise data directed at quantifiable facts, represented in numerical and
statistical format (Creswell, 2009). In other words, quantitative research is built on a
perception of the world in which all experiences and events are observable and
discernible facts (ibid).
In contrast, the standard operating procedure for qualitative researchers is to
use the collection process as a means to understand observable facts within a
contextually precise setting (i.e. real world observation) (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative
research is generally conducted in a natural setting in order to make sense of the
contextual significance of observable phenomena openly, without the aid of
statistical analysis (ibid).
This study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to draw on
the strengths of both approaches while reducing the weaknesses associated with
mono-method research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
A mixed method
approach is applied in this research as a number of businesses enquiries analysed
using both methods, and a set of quantitatively analysed international transactions.

3.2.1 Study Analysis
Analysis of research data was captured through a number of vectors. For
both quantitative and qualitative analysis, data was compiled into charts. The
qualitative data retrieved from phase one was directly represented in a simple flow
chart, detailing a visual progression of the eight barriers to anti-money laundering
compliance in ARS agencies. A mixed methods approach was used in phase two.
Data sets were extracted and collated into separate charts. Quantitative data points
collected in phase two were represented in charts in percentile form, which allowed
in-depth discussion on the state of legislative adherence in ARS agencies. Phase
three data results are extracted through observational analysis of international
transaction sheets.
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3.3 RESEARCH ORIGINS AND FOCUS
This research provides a unique insight to the standard of legislative
adherence in Australian ARS agencies. Prior research found that the practice of
informal remittances persists despite the illegality of such systems under anti-money
laundering legislation. Furthermore, the ongoing use of informal (illegal) remittance
services is motivated by a culturally-based lack of trust in formal banking systems,
rather than a desire for criminal gain (Cook & Smith, 2011 a). In this context there
may be other factors (outside of legal adherence) that explain the practice of
transferring money through informal remittance services. The practice of ARS
transfers exposes a problem in Australia’s regulatory system, which operates in a
formal ‘Western’ manner. As a result fails to address the key factors which may
influence the choice of money transfer system within the community. Therefore it is
assumed that if culturally sensitive changes are made to Australia’s regulation of the
ARS sector, then the persistence of high risk unregulated remittance activity will
diminish.
The results of the research analysed in chapters five and six, provide
evidence to support the need for greater cultural awareness, rather than stronger
regulation in the ARS sector. This research reveals non-compliance in the ARS
industry, propagated by the existence of eight significant barriers to compliance for
remittance providers, which range from cultural, environmental, and trust based
networks, to commercial and regulatory opportunism.

3.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter outlined the theoretical framework used to support the research
materials and methods. In order to answer the principal question behind this study a
mixed methods approach was taken. Quantitative data was collected from business
inquiries and international transactions to discern a level of legislative adherence in
ARS agencies. With qualitative data collated through an extensive literature review
informing the existence of eight significant barriers to anti-money laundering
compliance in ARS. The use of mixed methods in this study is intended to increase
the strength and validity of its results. The research based origins of this study have
led to a focus on the ARS sector, and the need for greater cultural awareness in its
regulation, due to issues in the context of legislative adherence, and the barriers to
regulatory compliance.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MATERIALS AND METHODS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the materials and methods used to
effectively answer the principal and supporting research questions posed in this
study. In order to achieve this goal a seven stage method was used which includes
three distinct data collection phases. This chapter will discuss in detail the three
phases of data collection engaged by this project, the reliability and validity of the
research, and outline details of the ethical clearance granted to this research project.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
This project was modelled in seven stages in order to effectively collect and
analyse the research data (see Figure 15). The three stages consisted of an
extensive literature review (Phase 1), a series of business enquiries (Phase 2), and a
set of international transactions (Phase 3). This research used a hybrid approach to
data collection.
Figure 15. Research Procedure with Seven Stage Research Methodology
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4.2.1 The Literature Review as Phase One
The first step in the research process was to gain a broad understanding of
the literature in order to inform the design of the research project. For the purpose of
this project, the literature review is classified as Phase One of the collection process.
This is primarily because, in conjunction with prior research, the literature supports
the existence of eight significant barriers to compliance for ARS agencies. This
theory underpins the first supporting research question.
Figure 16. Eight Significant Barriers to Regulatory Compliance in ARS
1.Culturally
Insensitive
Regulatory
Measures

6. Familial and
Trust Networks

7. Informal
Environment

2. Limitation of
Knowledge and
Understanding

5. Commercial
Imperative

8.Informal
Legacies

3. Allure of Large
Profits

4.Time, Money and
the Lack of
Resources

Compliance

The literature review draws from more than 100 sources, with the key authors
being Nikos Passas (1999; 2003; 2006; Maimbo & Passas, 2005), Michael Levi (Levi
& Gilmore, 2003; Levi & Reuter, 2006), and Peter Reuter (Reuter & Truman, 2004;
Levi & Reuter, 2006). The secondary goal of the review was to build the foundation
for measuring legislative adherence in alternative remittance systems. This was
achieved by exploring and analysing Australian and international legislation, and the
relevant literatures. A key publication for this study was The Journal of Money
Laundering Control, which is archived in the Emerald database (Emerald-Insight,
2012).

4.2.2 Business Inquiries as Phase Two
Business inquiries were carried out by phone and email with the primary focus
on the standard transfer practices that occurred in each ARS agency contacted. The
first step in this process is outlined in Stage 2 of the research process chart (see
Figure 15), which was to identify ARS agencies using local and online sources.
Figure 16 depicts the range of local and online sources accessed to identify ARS
businesses. Of a total of 88 Australian remittance providers who were originally
identified, a total of 50 remittance providers were contacted, whilst a further 38
providers were discarded as being unreliable and difficult to authenticate. A total of
six independent ARS businesses were found in community newspapers, the
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remaining 13 were sourced online. Contact was made with 17 licensed Australia
post offices (LPO’s), and six franchised Australia post outlets. A further eight travel
businesses were contacted (including the Flight Centre franchise), all of whom
provide MoneyGram transfer services.
Figure 17. Local and Online Sources for Business Enquiries
Community
Newspapers

Online Sources

Indian Link

Australia Post Office Locator

Oriental Post

Yellow Pages

Australia Asia Business
Weekly

www.moneygram.com

Oriental Leisure & Living
Australian Migration
Times

Flight Centre Store Locator

Australian Chinese Times
The Epoch Times Perth
Edition

www.truelocal.com.au

www.whitepages.com.au

www.aussielocal.com.au

Calls and emails were made in an anonymous manner as a new customer
would who has little knowledge of money transfers and their associated regulations.
Phone contacts made up the majority of inquiries. There were 48 calls enabling
extensive data from multiple agencies, which took place over a twenty one day
period. Furthermore, emails were expected to demonstrate a lack of direct contact
with staff, whilst delivering only a small amount of information in a relatively longer
period of time (1-2 days). Thus although very few email contacts were made (2), the
information gathered through phone contacts enabled a greater depth of observation
and built the foundation for supporting question two.
Throughout the phase two collection process, the researcher was able to
complete the majority of inquiries and record adequate detail on a pre-prepared call
sheet, which prompted the researcher to ask the relevant questions (see Figure 18).
The most effective opening to an inquiry was found to be a polite greeting followed
by reference to a friend’s advice, inferring that the contacted agency provides
remittance services. Assuming an affirmative response, the researcher would then
outline a need to transfer a friend some money, beginning with AUD $300, to a
destination in Asia. Certain transfer destinations were limited to specific countries,
usually based on the ethnic background of each specific agency. The researcher
would determine this aspect of the ARS service based on the context and details
observed in the source (i.e. newspaper or website), prior to the inquiry.
If during the course of a contact phone call, the staff member cited no
requirement for identification, the researcher would prompt the staff member with a
general question.
This inquiry was regarding any further requirements to
successfully carry out a transfer. If this prompt resulted in a negative response, then
the ‘No ID required’ box was checked. This method enabled the researcher to avoid
directly raising the question of identification requirements in order to evade false
positives in the data.
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Figure 18. Business Inquiries Call Sheet

Any identifiable details recorded in relation to individual ARS businesses were
intended as a guide for the researcher only, and have been withheld to satisfy the
ethical and privacy concerns of this data collection. The call sheet was designed to
record general details among specifics about international transfers (i.e. identification
requirement, fees, and in some cases a maximum transfer rate was discussed), in
order to enable the detection of any previously overlooked research vectors.
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4.2.4 International Transactions as Phase Three
In phase three of the data collection the researcher processed six
international transactions of varying amounts. The purpose of this phase was to see
if customer identification standards extend beyond national borders. By testing
remittance agencies with small value transactions it was possible to categorise areas
of identification and user verification non-compliance based on country of
destination, speed of transaction, and cost of transaction. Each transaction also
established the customer record-taking practices of each remitting agency. Each
agency was also characterised in terms of their practice of recording and supplying
financial receipt information. The data collection also revealed information about the
process of transfers by international remittance agencies which send money into
Australia. More specifically, data was sought on identification standards both in
Australia and in other countries. The collection captured information about the
exchange rate, and the contact protocol for the receipt of monies (see Figure 19). A
single transfer was made to Zimbabwe, three transfers were made through Kenya
and Dubai, and a set of two transfers were made to and from Pakistan. Transfer
records were returned via email.
Figure 19. Remittance Data Collection Record Sheet
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4.3 RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, AND ETHICAL CLEARANCE
This study was intended to examine a small sample of money transfer
agencies and their legislative adherence in Australia’s alternative remittance sector.
The study is reliable and valid in the context of showing the results of a small number
of remitters and their compliance trends in the ARS sector. This study is limited in
external validity and as such there is a strong case for further research in this area to
test the results of this study. In order to conduct this study the researcher posed as
a customer trying to transfer money internationally. As a consequence, the
researcher was required to obtain ethical clearance through the Edith Cowan
University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), due to the legislationfocussed testing conducted in the research.

4.3.1 Deception and the need for Anonymity:
The data collected from remittance agencies included the prospect of
obtaining data about staff and employees who may have allowed small value
transactions without the full compliance with Australian legislative requirements in
regards to identification. In order to proceed with the collection of this data, all
enquiries and transactions have been undertaken as if the researcher was in fact an
ordinary customer seeking to remit money to an international destination. This
involved deception. Before any data collection was commenced ethics clearance
was obtained to allow such data collection to take place under these conditions. All
information was recorded according to the ethical guidelines set out and all
information pertaining to individual remittance agencies has been maintained in an
anonymous format. The ECU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) granted
ethics for this research on the basis that it met the requirements of the National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (Government, 2007 a).

4.4 CONCLUSION
In conclusion this chapter has detailed the methods and materials used in the
process of this research project. The seven stages (see Figure 15) of the project
were discussed incorporating a three phase data collection process. The first phase
covered the eight significant barriers to compliance in ARS businesses discovered
by the literature review (phase one). The second phase outlined the system used to
collect data from ARS agencies in order to determine a state of legislative adherence
within money transfer businesses. The international transactions initiated in phase
three were undertaken in order to gain a greater understanding of transfer services
and the operations of ARS agencies which send money to and from Australia. Finally
the reliability, validity and ethical clearance attained to conduct this study was
discussed. This section held that the research carried out in this project should be
viewed as a relatively small sample of indicative legislative adherence in the ARS
sector only, and that there is a strong case for further research to test the results of
this study. Ethical clearance was obtained from Edith Cowan University in order to
conduct this research.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter five provides detail and analysis on the results of all three phases of data
collection. Phase one results will cover data revealed by the literature review
detailing the eight barriers to anti-money laundering compliance in Australian money
transfers. Phase two outlines a description and analysis of results collated from the
50 business inquiries in order to answer the principal question. Phase three
presents the data collected from six international transactions and provides analysis
of the results. A summary of findings is also given at the conclusion of this chapter.

5.2 PHASE ONE – THE EIGHT BARRIERS TO REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
The literature review carried out in this project was intended to inform and
support the measurement of legislative adherence in alternative remittance
agencies. Upon completion of an extensive review of the literatures, the researcher
developed a theory based on a well-developed understanding of alternative
remittance systems. This understanding provided a platform for the categorisation of
a number of significant barriers to anti-money laundering compliance.
Figure 20. Eight Significant Barriers to Regulatory Compliance in ARS
1.Culturally
Insensitive
Regulatory
Measures

6. Familial and
Trust Networks

7. Informal
Environment

2. Limitation of
Knowledge and
Understanding

5. Commercial
Imperative

8.Informal
Legacies

3. Allure of Large
Profits

4. Time, Money
and the Lack of
Resources

Compliance

The eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance (see Figure 20) are based on
observations made from a literature review of over 100 sources. All eight points are
analysed and prioritised in terms of significance. This is done in reference to
compliance within the context of the broader ARS sector, and the threat of
exploitation to national security. The prioritisation of barriers is expressed in Figure
20 through shades of grey, with the darkest showing the greatest risk of exploitation.
The lightest shaded barriers still represent significant barriers to compliance but are
not as likely to greatly increase the risk of exploitation to launder money as a factor
in the international ARS community.
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5.2.1 First Barrier: Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures
The first and most significant barrier to AML/CTF compliance in the ARS
industry is drawn from the lack of cultural awareness evident in the design of
Australia’s regulatory controls for alternative remittance services. After the attacks
on the World Trade Centre in 2001, nine special recommendations were drawn up
by the FATF to combat money laundering, which includes Special Recommendation
VI. This recommendation states that;
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities,
including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or
value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer
system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the
FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial
institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that
carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal
sanctions. (FATF-GAFI, 2010)
The way in which these recommendations are enacted is up to each individual
nation. In this context Australia’s anti-money laundering regime, which is designed
to meet FATF AML/CTF standards, has designed and implemented regulations for
the ARS sector in a similar style to the US and UK (AIC, 2011). However despite the
formal and strict nature of Australia’s AML/CTF regulations on the operation of ARS
services, the use of informal systems of remittance by ordinary Australian expatriates
continues (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).
The use of informal Hawala and Hundi style services is pervasive (Passas,
2003; Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Cook & Smith, 2011 a). Studies have found that the
general use of informal remittance systems is motivated by a cultural lack of trust in
formal banking systems, rather than a desire for criminal gain (Hammond, 2011;
Passas, 2003). In this context there is a reasonable explanation for operating an
informal remittance service. This conclusion exposes the flaw in Australia’s antimoney laundering framework, which has designed ARS regulations from a formal
‘Western’ perspective, and as a result fails to address this fundamental cultural
impasse evident in the money transfer community. Furthermore the US style of
alternative remittance regulation lacks validity due to a paucity of research on the
effectiveness of compliance measures in the remittance sector (Passas, 2006).
Therefore changes need to be made to Australia’s regulation of the remittance
sector. These alterations should be based on; consultation with the ARS community,
an understanding of the impact of cultural factors associated with the traditional use
of money transfer agencies, and academic research submissions relevant to issues
in the Australian remittance sector. If this occurs then the persistence of high risk
non-compliant remittance activity will likely diminish.
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5.2.2 Second Barrier: Limitation of Knowledge and Understanding
The second most significant barrier to compliance is the standard of
knowledge and understanding required of money transfer agents in order to comply
with Australian AML/CTF legislation. Issues informing this barrier include; the
complexity of risk management requirements, a lack of appropriate training and
education, and a lack of understanding with regard to the threat posed by the risk of
money laundering and terrorism financing.
Australia’s AML/CTF regime requires that money transfer agents design,
implement, and maintain a risk management portfolio as part of their everyday
business. This requires that remittance agents develop a personal understanding of
risk management or employ a consultant at significant cost to implement a risk
management portfolio (Australia, 2012). Moreover all agents and their staff must be
trained in effective customer due diligence (CDD) processes, detection of suspicious
transactions and fake I.D., and compliance reporting requirements applicable to
transactions over AUD $10,000, including transactions to and from high risk
countries (AUSTRAC, 2007, 2007 a, 2011, 2011 a). In order to aid agents in
meeting this standard AUSTRAC has created a risk management guide for small-tomedium sized businesses (AUSTRAC, 2006), and set up a multi language help desk
(AUSTRAC, 2011 a).
This barrier to compliance is a result of the complex nature of Australia’s
regulatory regime, which requires a high level of knowledge and understanding on
behalf of alternative remittance agents. This is significant because remittance
agents are unlikely to understand the threat posed by the risk of money laundering.
This is due to the following factors:
a) English is generally a second language for agents.
b) Money transfer agents are unlikely to have a wealth of experience
detecting indicators of money laundering and terrorism financing.
c) The majority of remittance agents are small business owners who are
unlikely to have taken a course in risk management.
d) The effective design, implementation, and ongoing review of a risk
management portfolio, requires greater understanding of the process than
is afforded to an agent by reading a short guide.
e) Training staff when the agent has a limited understanding of these
concepts is unlikely to be effective.
Therefore if agents are unable to grasp the significance of the fundamental drivers
behind the costly and time consuming risk management and training requirements,
then they are unlikely to remain compliant with AML/CTF regulations. The pressure
to perform may also be a sufficient motivator for an agent to operate an unregistered
or underground transfer service.

5.2.3 Third Barrier: The Allure of Large Profits
The third major barrier to legislative compliance in money transfer agencies is
the allure of large profits. Every year an estimated AUD $2-4 billion is laundered
through Australia’s financial sector (Choo, 2008).
It is also estimated by
Masciandaro et al. (2007 p.200), that money launderers generally take a 5 to 15%
cut of the funds that they launder. While these figures are just estimates, it is well
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known that organised criminality is persistent due to the highly profitable nature of
the black market (UNDOC, 2012). Therefore it is valid to infer that a transfer agent
would make significantly more profit even if they were to take on a
compartmentalised role in the laundering process.
A report published in August 2012 (Stewart & Maley, 2012) details a number
of suspected cases involving Australian remittance agents supporting criminal
activity to accrue large profits. This detailed an ongoing investigation into the funding
of people smugglers through six remittance agencies in the Dandenong area of
suburban Melbourne (Stewart & Maley, 2012). Although the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) were not willing to comment specifically on the situation, the
investigators did express concern that six independent Hawala style money transfer
businesses were facilitating the funding of organised crime groups, involved in
human trafficking by boat into Australia (ibid).
The significance of this trend is also supported by evidence of organised
crime groups targeting the alternative remittance sector in Australia to launder
money. According to AUSTRAC (2011 g), enforcement authorities have detected
criminal groups which are targeting money remittance agencies to launder the
proceeds of crime. Sources of the laundered funds, cited by AUSTRAC (2011 g),
include: “...tax fraud, drug trafficking, tobacco smuggling, people smuggling, and
advance fee fraud (such as ‘Nigerian’ scams)” (p.17). Based on the points and
cases highlighted here, there is a valid trend supporting the significance of the allure
of large profits as a major barrier to anti-money laundering compliance in Australian
remittance agencies.

5.2.4 Fourth Barrier: Time, Money and the Lack of Resources
The Australian AML/CTF regulatory regime imposes a significant number of
requirements on remittance agencies. This includes the implementation of a
comprehensive risk management portfolio (Australia, 2012), ongoing training of staff,
and an in depth understanding and knowledge of complex AML/CTF risk
management concepts (AUSTRAC, 2006). On top of this money transfer agents
must also have the ability to detect and deny suspicious transactions, which includes
recognising fake identification (AUSTRAC, 2007, 2007 a, 2011, 2011 a). The
complexity and cost associated with these requirements represent significant
barriers to compliance for money transfer agencies, which are in general operated by
everyday citizens who are unlikely to possess the necessary resources to uphold
such a stringent and complex risk management regime.
The impact of time on a money transfer business is also an important factor if
the remittance business is genuine in its attempts to have an accurate assessment
of its risk. In order to achieve and maintain compliance, a significant amount of time
can be spent reporting, carrying out risk management processes, training staff, and
enduring its impact on profitability. All of these factors could lead to non-compliance
or the failure of the business (in worst case scenarios). In addition there is a AUD
$300 supervisory levy fee collected by AUSTRAC, which includes a one cent fee per
reported transaction, to recoup the cost of regulation (AUSTRAC, 2012 d). It is
important to note that many remittance agencies are small businesses. Many of
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which serve small ethnic communities, and are popular due to their low cost
operations and the cultural and familial trust-based networks that they share with
their customers (Cook & Smith, 2010; 2011 a). Therefore the compliance
requirements imposed on these agencies are likely to act collectively as a substantial
barrier to compliance.

5.2.5 Fifth Barrier: Commercial Imperative
The next major barrier to compliance in Australia’s remittance sector is the
prioritisation of commercial imperative over regulatory compliance. The emphasis of
profit outcomes over best practice is a common trend across many customer service
industries. This tendency is often characterised by the sacrifice of customer service
standards in order to cut costs and improve profits. This can occur in many different
forms within regular business, and it is not an illegal practice. However given the
significant regulatory pressure on remittance agencies, it is likely that AML/CTF
compliance would be sacrificed in order to improve the flow of business. This would
likely be a choice made in an attempt to improve customer satisfaction by reducing
processing time (i.e. waiving the need for full identification compliance), therefore
increasing the popularity of the business and its profit margin.

5.2.6 Sixth Barrier: Familial and Trust Networks
Familial and trust networks play a significant role in alternative remittance
systems (Hammond, 2011; Shehu, 2004; Maimbo, 2003; Cook & Smith, 2011 a).
Multiple communities of South Asian and Middle Eastern people make regular use of
informal remittance systems. This is because of a culturally based trust in IVTS and
alternative remittance providers above formal financial systems (ibid).
For
expatriates of developing countries, the roots of distrust in formal financial systems
stem partly from a persistent trend of instability and corruption throughout their
countries history (Maimbo, 2003 p.37; Rees, 2010 p.15). This experience is a key
influencing factor in the decision to use informal or alternative financial systems.
Furthermore, money transfer agencies exist in general as small businesses
with single owners or franchisees. This means that an expatriate of any of the
alternative remittance reliant Australian ethnic communities (i.e. Filipino, Somali,
Indian, Vietnamese, and Samoan) (Rees, 2010), has the opportunity to develop a
relationship with the transfer agent in order to garner trust. When compared to the
nameless face behind a branded bank or financial institution which may change
frequently, the factor of trust is significant (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).
However, the trust based relationship between agent and customer is also a
substantial barrier to compliance. The familial and trust based relationship between
money transfer agents and their customers stands as a motivator for complacency
and non-compliance. This is because it is likely that once a customer is known to a
money transfer agent, the heightened familiarity is likely to undermine AML/CTF
regulations, especially in terms of identification requirements and suspicious
transaction reporting. In simple terms an agent that is familiar and friendly with a
customer is more likely to ignore identification procedure or disregard a suspicious
transaction when dealing with that customer. Consequently a relationship of
heightened trust and familiarity stands as a significant barrier to AML/CTF
compliance.
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5.2.7 Seventh Barrier: Informal Legacy
Remittance systems used by developing countries, (such as Hawala and
Hundi), have been operating for over 100 years prior to the existence of the first
formal banking systems (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002; Passas, 2003). Modern
day nations in Africa, Asia, and throughout the Middle East, still rely heavily on
‘informal’ or, in a Western context, ‘alternative’ systems of remittance (Passas,
1999). Other factors which lead developing countries to rely on money transfer
businesses include; access to financial services without the need for personal
identification, access to low cost services not available in formal financial sectors,
and the informal nature of transfer agencies allows customers to build a relationship
of familiarity with a transfer agent (Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Rees, 2010). Therefore
it is clear that the appeal of money transfer agencies is persistent globally because
they allow grass roots, low income access to financial services which are culturally
appropriate for their customers.
Alternative remittance systems also allow
developing, conflict ridden, and economically unstable countries to gain access to
much needed funds when formal systems have failed (Maimbo, 2003; Razavy 2005).
As a result previously informal remittance agents may find it difficult to adjust
to their new responsibilities. This means that the history of informal remittance may
compromise the application of AML/CTF processes within a transfer agency. As a
result an agent may be averse to any change in procedure, and may continue
operating in an informal manner whist ‘cooking the books’ on paper (Cook & Smith,
2010 p.16). This type of non-compliance has occurred in the past and was detected
by AUSTRAC (AUSTRAC, 2012 a).

5.2.8 Eighth Barrier: The Informal Environment –
(Where Remittance businesses sell other goods as well)
The eighth barrier to compliance is focussed on the influence of an informal
environment. This is where a business may transfer money, but may also be
involved in the sale of other goods (e.g. Meat products, Fast food, Postal services,
and even videos). This is likely to undermine the strict formality required under
Australian AML/CTF regulations. The influence of an alternative remittance agent’s
informal environment could reduce the adherence to regulatory procedures within
money transfer agencies for a number of reasons. Firstly, alternative remittance
agents typically operate a transfer service within their primary business. This means
that their primary focus is may extend to unrelated business such as selling
groceries, making kebabs, or even renting movies (Cook & Smith, 2010). Secondly,
these small businesses are not likely to conduct their business activities in a formal
manner, allowing other services to act as distractions to AML/CTF compliance.
These factors are present in the majority of Australian remittance agencies which
explains why the influence of this informal environment may lead to an informal
approach to record keeping.
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5.3 PHASE ONE: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, these eight barriers are moderated by the impact of the first
barrier; Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures. The second, fourth, and fifth
barriers are influenced by Australia’s overly prescriptive anti-money laundering
regulations. The remaining barriers are clearly amplified by cultural factors.
The significance of all eight barriers to compliance in the Australian AML/CTF
system is apparent when seen from their aggregated effect upon remittance
businesses. Whilst individually each barrier impacts upon compliance, as a package
they represent a stronger obstruction. Firstly, the Australian anti-money laundering
system has been designed absent of the cultural awareness necessary to effectively
regulate the alternative remittance sector. In response to this changes need to be
made to regulations. Secondly, money transfer agents face a significant barrier in
terms of their limited understanding of what is necessary to achieve compliance
under Australian law. Thirdly the money transfer sector is at a disadvantage from
bureaucratic and criminal expectations, with the allure of criminal profits made more
significant by overbearing and uninformed regulations. In the fourth instance,
alternative remittance agencies lack the necessary resources to achieve compliance
under AML/CTF regulations. As such the allure of unregulated operation is
amplified; this represents a significant threat to Australia’s national security. The fifth
barrier to compliance highlights the influence of a money transfer agent’s commercial
imperative over the top of compliance, where the effective sale of primary services is
likely to take precedence. The sixth barrier refers to customer trust relationships
based around familiarity. The seventh barrier highlights the opportunity to side-step
regulatory control by cooking the books. The eighth barrier challenges AML/CTF
compliance through a shared focus on unrelated sales and services.

5.4 PHASE TWO RESULTS: BUSINESS INQUIRIES
The phase two data collection process consists of a total sample size of fifty
business inquiries made to Australian remittance agencies (n=50). This data group
provides answers to the principal research question. It achieves this by highlighting
legislative adherence trends within the Australian remittance community.
Figure 21. Primary Photo Identification Standards
Valid Photo Identification in ARS Agencies
National or
international
driver’s license

Passport issued
by the
Commonwealth

International
passport issued by
foreign government
or U.N.

National Proof
of Age Card
(Commonwealth
issued)

National identity card
issued by a foreign
government or the
U.N.

Fig 21. (AUSTRAC, 2007 b)
To ensure clarity about the segmentation of different identification
requirements, Figure 21 indicates five types of primary photo identification in ARS
agencies (AUSTRAC, 2007 b). These are; a national or international driver’s
license, an Australian passport, a passport issued by a foreign government or the
United Nations, a proof of age card issued by the Commonwealth, or a national
identity card issued by a foreign government or the United Nations (ibid). Any other
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form of identification, such as a student card, is not considered valid and indicates
non-compliance with Australia AML/CTF regulations.
Figure 22. Identification Requirements in ARS Agencies

Accepted
ID

Australia
Post LPO
Western
Union

Australia
Post
Franchised
Western
Union

Travel
Business
with
MoneyGram

Independent
Store-front
Business

Total

Primary
Photo I.D.

29.4%

33.3%

90%

52.6%

48%

Student
I.D.

70.6%

66.6%

10%

31.5%

46%

No I.D.

0

0

0

15.7%

6%

Total

34 %

12%

16%

38 %

n=50

The ARS agencies contacted in this phase were organised into four
categorical business types (see Figure 22). Australia Post outlets (which provide
Western Union (WU) transfer services) exist in two forms, Licensed Post Offices
(LPO’s) and Franchised Offices. The other two groups into which the store-front
ARS agencies have been categorised as; Travel Businesses which provide the
MoneyGram brand of ARS service, and Independent Store-front Business’s.
Data was aggregated against all four categories. Licensed post outlets
accounted for 34% of the data, franchised post at 12%, and travel businesses at
16%. Independent store-front businesses represent 38% of the total data set (see
Figure 23).
Figure 23. Spread of Data Sample

Data

Australia
Post LPO
Western
Union

Australia
Post
Franchised
Western
Union

Travel
Business
with
MoneyGram

Independent
Store-front
Business

Total

Total

34 %

12%

16%

38 %

n=50

5.4.1 Australia Post and Western Union
Australia Post is a Government Business Enterprise which is owned entirely
by the Commonwealth of Australia (Post, 2012 a). Australia post provides over 100
vital official services through its 4,400 outlets, which includes 2,934 Licensed Post
Offices (LPO’s) and 29 franchised stores (ibid). These products and services include
but are not limited to; providing complete passport and license application services,
bill payment, travellers checks, foreign currency exchange, stationary, entertainment
and educational media and software, commemorative collectables (Post, 2012), and
international remittances through the globally recognised ARS, Western Union (Post,
2012 c).
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Figure 24. Comparison of Franchised and LPO’s
Franchised Post Office

Licensed Post Office (LPO)

Access to Management and Business
Systems.

Access to Management and Business Systems.

Comprehensive training to be completed
before agreement begins and on-going
professional training and support.

All training of staff is mandatory and the
responsibility of the owner.

10 year term with exit payment on
expiration

License has no set term and can be assigned
at any point.

Shared ongoing revenue.

Income dependent on fees and commissions
relative to work performed.

Shared risks and benefits to both parties.

All risk is carried by the licensee.

-No capital outlay for fit-out or stock.
-Fully equipped outlet with stock
provided on consignment

Licensee pays fees for all start up and any
maintenance.

-Franchisee only pays running costs and
rights fee to Aus Post.

Fig 24. (Post, 2012 b; 2012 d)
There are many differences between a Licensed Post Office and a franchised
office (see Figure 24). An LPO manager is responsible for the comprehensive
training of all staff (Post, 2012 d). Conversely a franchisee is provided will all training
before the agreement is started and receives on-going professional training and
support from Australia Post over its ten year term (Post, 2012 b).
A franchisee does not carry the financial burden or risk alone, and the
manager need only pay base operating costs including labour and a franchise fee
(Post, 2012 b). In contrast, LPO managers carry the entire burden of risk, cost of
stock, labour, training, and on-going maintenance of the business (Post, 2012 d).
Licensed Post Offices have a lower level of support to franchised post outlets and
may show less compliance with anti-money laundering regulations in comparison to
their franchised counterparts. However, an LPO is less controlled, easier to access,
and has a much greater potential income, with less recurring fees (Post, 2012 b;
2012 d). This explains the influencing factors which have led to a larger LPO share
of Australia Post offices at 2,934 compared to only 29 franchise stores (ibid).

5.4.2 A High Risk Combination: Australia Post and Western Union
The results reveal that 70.6% of licensed postal staff, and 66% of franchised
Australia Post staff, expressed a willingness to accept student identification for an
international transfer (see Figure 25). The comparatively high rate of non-compliance
in franchised offices highlights an issue beyond the commercial structure of Australia
Post outlets. Where the literature and data indicates a more developed training
culture for franchised post offices, the small difference between franchised and
licensed post offices suggests that ongoing training alone is an insufficient
explanation for high levels of identification systems decay.
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 61

Figure 25. Identification Standards in Australia Post Offices
Accepted ID

Australia Post
LPO Western
Union

Australia Post
Franchised
Western Union

Primary Photo I.D.

29.4%

33.3%

Student I.D.

70.6%

66.6%

No I.D.

0

0

Total

34 %

12%

Almost all Australia Post outlets (3,200) are Western Union remittance
providers (Post, 2012 c). As at 2012, approximately 2.4 million identification checks
have been processed through Australia Post retail outlets (Post, 2012 a). Given that
so many outlets are registered remitters, and so many identification checks have
taken place, it may be that authorities assume that the Western Union services in
these stores are at low risk of exploitation. Furthermore post offices are significantly
exposed to the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth barriers to compliance (Limitation of
Knowledge and Understanding, Limited Time/Money and Resources, Commercial
Imperative, and Informal Environment). This exposure is partially due to the
significant number of services these stores provide. Australia post employees are
required to understand the correct procedure for over 100 different services, as well
as ensuring compliance to AML/CTF obligations in the operation of their Western
Union transfer service. The knowledge and understanding required to effectively
provide Australia Post services represents substantial regulatory commitment. When
the added AML/CTF requirements for WU transfers are taken into account this
obligation implies a greater sense of responsibility.
In conclusion, the threat of money laundering through the Western Union
systems attached to Australia Post Offices is high, with over 70% of LPO’s and 66%
of franchise staff expressing a willingness to accept student identification. The lack
of compliance in Australia Post offices is likely due to four factors. These factors are;
a.
b.
c.
d.

Poor staff training standards (Barriers 2 & 4).
Limited knowledge and understanding (Barrier 2).
Prioritisation of commercial imperative (Barrier 5).
Informal environment (Barrier 8).

The results of this research show that the profit and accessibility focussed design
applied to the LPO system has bred a significant trend of AML/CTF non-compliance.
However the seemingly strong framework of the franchised model has not precluded
those stores from non-compliance. This is true in spite of the comprehensive and
ongoing training provided by Australia Post. This highlights the fact that both
franchised and licensed postal stores have substantial issues with training and
education on anti-money laundering regulatory compliance. The large number of
individual financial services and transactional products distract staff and employees
away from each store’s regulatory obligations.
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5.4.3 Independent Shop-front Remitters
Independent remitters made up a significant portion of the phase two data set
at 38% (see Figure 26). The data set includes results from agencies fitting the Semiformal, excepting PayPal, and Covert Non-aligned categories outlined in Figure 26.
The majority of inquiries were made to Semi-formal ARS agencies and three were
made to Covert Non-aligned remittance services. The covert remittance businesses
were operating out of ethnically focussed stores, which were a butchers shop, video
store, and restaurant.
Figure 26. Remittance Categories and Characteristics
Remittance Characteristics and
Brand Examples

Remittance Service Categories







Semi-formal





Covert Non-aligned



Transfers may be secondary to main business.
Transfers to many different countries.
Provides online services.
Operates out of a shop front.
Advertises to the public.
(i.e. WU, PayPal, MoneyGram, Ez Money Express and
UAE Exchange).
Operates out of an unlikely premise (i.e. Taxi,
Restaurant, Butcher, Ethnic Video Store, and Private
Residence).
Not Brand Affiliated.
Relies on word of mouth and familial networks instead
of advertising.
Hawala, Hundi, and Black Market Peso style operations.

The results highlight a mixed level of non-compliance in the independent
store-front sector of the ARS community (see Figure 27). A total of 31.5% of
independent agents contacted were willing to accept a student identification card,
and 15.7% of the sample did not require identification to make a transaction. A slight
majority of agents (52.6%) required primary photo identification to authorise a
transfer. Overall however 47.2% of agents contacted did not require primary photo
identification and as a result were not compliant with Australia’s AML/CTF legislation.
Figure 27. Independent Store-front Business Data

Accepted ID

Independent Store-front
Business

Primary Photo I.D.

52.6%

Student I.D.

31.5%

No I.D.

15.7%

Total

38 %

5.4.4 Business Inquiry Observations
During a number of the business inquiries significant confusion was displayed
by many ARS staff with regard to the definition of what is considered valid
identification. When making a contact ARS staff would often mention but not specify
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an identification requirement. In response the researcher would ask “is student ID
ok?”, which would generally result in a yes/no response. However on multiple
occasions staff would ask in return whether the card had a photo, signature, and an
expiry date. An affirmation of these characteristics of a student card was always
given. This confirms that as long as these features were on the student card, then it
was accepted. The confusion expressed by ARS staff further supports the
significance of the limitation of knowledge and understanding as a persistent barrier
to compliance. It also supports the inadequacy of Australia’s anti-money laundering
regime and its failure to effectively inhibit non-compliance in the ARS sector.
One business inquiry found that an ARS agency made it a standard operation
to only sight identification on the first visit to the agency. After the first visit it was
explained that “your information will be saved onto our computer and there is no
need to worry about bringing identification if you come again”. The agency was also
willing to take student identification on the first visit. This practice is illegal (Australia,
2012), and is easily exploited to launder money. For example if a customer were to
supply fake identification and it was not detected, then the ‘once-only’ identification
check would prevent further scrutiny of the fake identification.
Independent store front-remitters are still under significant threat of
exploitation for money laundering, despite extensive regulatory controls (see Figure
27). While the compliance level of the independents is better than Australia Post,
the compartmentalised structure of storefront remitters means that they are more
likely to be targeted by organised criminals to launder money, in comparison to a
Post Office. The detection of three underground remittance services in this data set
further reinforces difficulties with Australia’s anti-money laundering regime, and the
need to take alternative steps to improve the cultural insensitivity of regulation in the
ARS sector. Alternative remittance businesses which operate independently are the
most likely to be substantially impacted by the eight barriers to compliance, and as a
result move their business underground.

5.4.5 Travel Business: A More Secure ARS Platform
Travel businesses made up 16% of the total business inquiries data set. In
contrast to the other three categories, there is a high level of compliance recorded.
The remittance businesses contacted to retrieve this data were travel agencies
which are owned and operated by multinational corporation Flight Centre Limited
(2011). The majority of inquiries were made to Flight Centre, however Escape
Travel, Student Flights, and Travel Money Oz, are affiliates of Flight Centre Limited
and were also contacted (Limited, 2011). All of these travel agencies are also
MoneyGram agents. This service is provided to facilitate international money
transfers in order to support their travelling customers.
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Figure 28. Travel Business Inquiries Data

Accepted ID

Travel
Business
with
MoneyGram

Primary Photo
I.D.

90%

Student I.D.

10%

No I.D.

0

Total

16%

Travel agencies which provide MoneyGram services (see Figure 28) showed
high levels of compliance to identification requirements. Ninety percent of travel
agencies require primary photo identification to conduct a money transfer, while only
ten percent were willing to accept student identification. This trend highlights the
context in which Australian AML/CTF regulations are effective in the ARS sector.
The Flight Centre Limited Corporation is a multibillion dollar, multinational
organisation which has the significant resources to effectively implement and
maintain systems which ensure AML/CTF compliance (Limited, 2011 c). Flight
Centre has professional policies in place to deal with unethical behaviour and
misconduct in the workplace (Limited, 2011 a), and an ongoing and effective risk
management policy (Limited, 2011 b). These are three reasons why this business is
effective at implementing and maintaining compliance with Australian AML/CTF
regulations.
More importantly, the travel industry has other advantages which overshadow
the eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance faced by alternative remittance agents
outside this sector. The key factors which aid the travel sector beyond the significant
level of resources available to large business are;
a) Travel agents have a peak representative body called AFTA (2012 a).
b) The nature of travel is strictly regulated in a way appropriate to the industry
(AFTA, 2012 b).
c) The travel industry has a culture of financial backup (AFTA, 2012 b).
d) Flight centre agencies have only three areas of business (Travel, Insurance,
and Remittance/Finance services) (Flight Centre, 2012).
These aspects of the travel industry indicate a higher level of compliance standing
than Australia’s general ARS sector. There are very few barriers to achieving and
maintaining regulatory compliance, whether in the area of travel or AML/CTF
legislation.
Regulation of the travel industry is designed specifically for the benefit of
travel agents and their business (AFTA, 2012 a). The Australian Federation of
Travel Agents (AFTA) is a government run representative body which guides best
practice in the travel sector (AFTA, 2012 b). Its mission is: “to promote travel and
tourism and enhance the professionalism and profitability of its members through
effective representation in industry and government affairs, education and training
and by identifying and satisfying the needs of the travelling public” (AFTA, 2012).
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AFTA provides a mechanism to ensure that the positive development of the industry
is a key focus alongside government initiatives which shape regulatory measures.
AFTA also highlights the importance of improving the professionalism and
profitability of its members through the development and provision of certified
education and training (AFTA, 2012 a). The benefits of a peak body which develops
and implements regulations should not be understated.
Another advantage held by the travel industry over the general ARS sector is
its established culture of financial backup (AFTA, 2012 b). The travel industry
representative body AFTA trains and certifies travel agents to consult their
customers on the importance and benefits of travel insurance, as an effective risk
management tool for industry (ibid). This is an effective way of protecting the
industry’s customers, which in turn maintains consumer confidence in international
travel. Without that confidence the profitability of the travel industries commercial
imperative will decline. This use of financial risk management explains in part the
value of Flight Centre’s approach to AML/CTF requirements.
Flight Centre travel agencies also benefit due to the limited number of
services provided in each store (Flight Centre, 2012). Unlike the general population
of store-front ARS agents and staff, Flight Centre employees only need to attend to
three primary services; travel, insurance, and remittance/currency exchange services
(ibid). With less products and services surrounding an ARS transfer service,
AML/CTF compliance is less likely to be diluted by other aspects of an ARS
business. This also allows for additional education and training for staff on
regulatory requirements, decreasing the risk of exploitation for money laundering.
In conclusion, the results gathered from travel agencies highlights the need
for regulatory improvement. These results also cast a shadow over ARS regulations
that inhibit compliance rather than promoting it. With the improvements to the travel
sector facilitated by AFTA, the question remains as to why Australia’s ARS sector
lacks cohesive industry representation. Australia’s ARS sector struggles under
culturally and contextually insensitive regulations. The ARS industry would benefit
from official representation by a professional association. Without such a body, the
ARS sector is likely to continue to weaken Australia’s national security framework.

5.4.6 Overall Result of Business Inquiries
The results from the complete data set on business inquiries show the state of
legislative adherence in Australian ARS agencies (see Figure 29). From a total of 50
business inquiries, 46% of ARS agencies were willing to accept student identification
as validation for a substantial international transaction, while 6% did not require any
identification at all. In contrast 48% of ARS agencies were unwilling to take student
identification, instead indicating that only primary photo identification was acceptable.
These results indicate that strict AML/CTF regulation of the ARS sector has failed to
reduce the risk of exploitation in money transfer businesses.
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Figure 29. Overall State of Legislative Adherence.
Accepted ID

Total

Primary Photo
I.D.

48%

Student I.D.

46%

No I.D.

6%

Total

n=50

The high level of non-compliance in the phase two inquiries resonate with the
eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance (see Figure 29). These barriers indicate
design flaws in the regulatory framework applied to the Australian ARS sector. This
refers to the fact that Australia’s regulatory framework is based on international
standards instead of social and cultural factors, along with consultation with the ARS
sector. Therefore with over half of participants demonstrating non-compliance with
regulated identification requirements, the weakness evident in Australia’s ARS
community represents a serious threat to national security. The Australian remittance
community’s regulatory practices show the impact of ineffective international
AML/CTF standards (Passas, 2006). From the conclusion on Australia’s first and
only mutual evaluation in 2005, followed by the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012),
Australia’s anti-money laundering regime has advanced by gradually imposing costly
and demanding regulations on the ARS sector (AUSTRAC, 2007; 2008 c; 2009;
2010; 2011 h).
This ‘enforcement’ style of regulation moves the eight significant barriers to
compliance into the foreground of this discussion. Substantial barriers to compliance
include the limitation of understanding and knowledge which prevents the effective
training of ARS staff on compliance requirements. Other factors include the
prioritisation of commercial imperative over compliance processes, a lack of
resources, and the allure of large profits. This allows ARS agents to facilitate highly
profitable criminal activity in the face of complex and costly regulatory measures.
These barriers also stand as influential motivators for ARS agents to avoid regulatory
measures, and to consider moving their transfer service underground.
Australia should look to social and culturally derived community consultation
for a solution. In examining the level of compliance in Flight Centre travel agencies
(which provide MoneyGram transfer services), the regulation of Australia’s ARS
sector appears to benefit from the travel industry’s model. The travel industry gains
advantage from industry representation through AFTA. AFTA is an association
which develops best practice policy for the travel sector, in the interest of the industry
as a whole (AFTA, 2012 a). In a similar sense, the creation of a peak body to
represent members of the ARS community in the industry and government affairs
would provide a mechanism for reducing the informal approach to compliance within
the ARS industry. The peak body could also be in a position to develop ongoing
training and educational programs, eventually leading up to the creation of industry
certification standards for ARS agents.
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5.5 PHASE THREE: INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
5.5.1 Introduction
Phase three of data collection involved six international transfers in three sets.
The first set of transfers sent money from Australia to Kenya, then from Kenya to
Dubai, then from Dubai back to Australia. The second transfer was a single
transaction and with receipt in Zimbabwe. The third set of transfers was made to
and from Pakistan. Specific details about remittance agents have been removed/
redacted for privacy reasons and in order to satisfy the ethics requirements
underpinning the collection of this data.

5.5.2 International Transfers First Set
Figure 30. First Set: International Transfer and Receipt One

Transfer:
The first international transaction made to Kenya was through a remittance
agency in Victoria Park, Perth W.A (see Figure 30). This agency will only do
business with customers identified through a familial network of customers. As such
this requires that a friend or family member supply the remittance agent with one’s
personal details before the existence of the transfer service will be acknowledged by
staff. The informal remittance agency also doubles as a Food Wholesale business.
The transaction amount was AUD $200, which incurred a fee of AUD $10, at the
exchange rate of 1:1. No identification was required to make the transfer, and the
speed of remit was instant. No receipt was given for the transfer.
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Receipt:
Receipt of the converted US $190 occurred a day later in Bondeni, Mombasa
in Kenya. The receipt of these funds was made in a retail perfume store and the
recipient was informed of the waiting transaction via text message. Although no
identification was required to receive the funds, a name and phone number were
collected and recorded at the time of pick-up (see Figure 30).
Figure 31. First Set: International Transfer and Receipt Two

Transfer:
From Mombasa, US $180 was transferred on to Dubai on the same day as
the receipt of the funds from Australia (see Figure 31). The transfer cost a flat USD
$10 fee and was converted to Arab Emirates Dirham’s (AED), at the exchange rate
of 3.7:1. No receipt was given for the transaction and no identification was required.
It is noted that the transfer might possibly take an extra day due to closed trading for
some stores on Saturdays in Dubai. The normal speed of the transfer is instant.
Receipt:
The next day the funds were received in a suburb called Deira in Dubai, to the
sum of AED 666. The ARS agency through which the funds arrived was a Money
Exchange Dealer. No primary photo identification was required to receive the funds;
however the agent did sight the student identification of the receiver, and make a
record of their name and mobile number. A text message was sent to notify the
receiver of funds awaiting pick-up (see Figure 31).
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Figure 32. First Set: International Transfer and Receipt Three

Transfer:
The final transfer of AUD $170, revealed a total of $30 in transfer fees had
been accrued (see Figure 32). The exchange rate returning to Australia was 3.7:1,
which is the same rate which was applied from Mombasa to Dubai. Again, no
identification was required to make the transfer and no receipt was provided.
Receipt:
When the funds were received in Australia from Dubai, the same food
wholesaler in Victoria Park provided access to the funds (see Figure 32). A text
message was used to inform the receiver and a total of AUD $170 was received.
However in contrast to the original outgoing transfer made to Kenya, the remittance
agent required full primary photo identification from the receiver, which was provided
in the form of a passport. The ARS agent recorded the address, full name, date of
birth, date of issue on the passport, and the expiry date.

5.5.3 First Set: International Transactions Observations
Common characteristics across this set of international transfers are; a lack of
identification, no receipts given for transferring or receiving funds, a flat fee no matter
the destination, and low level recording of receivers details generally without sighting
identification. From the first transfer through to the last, Dubai to Australia, the ARS
agencies carried out transactions without sighting any form of identification. One
agent sighted a student identification card, and others made a note of receivers
name and mobile number expressing significant trust in their customers.
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When funds were received into Australia from Dubai, the ARS agent set a
different standard of identification requirements. This jump from no identification
standard to the very highest possible is different to the other transfers. The transfer
agent in Dubai was not concerned about the customer sending funds into Australia.
Outgoing transactions from Australia appear to present little concern for the food
wholesaler in Victoria Park. Yet an international transfer made out of Australia with
no identification is just as illegal as remittances flowing in which have not been
validated through details recorded from primary photo identification (Australia, 2012).

5.5.4 Second Transfer: Individual International Transfers to Zimbabwe
Figure 33 shows the transfer of money to Zimbabwe. This ticked boxes show
as black boxes over the appropriate answer. As with other transfers there are
several parts of each form which have been left blank by the remittance provider,
indicating a less exacting approach to the recording of transfer details.
Figure 33. Second Set: International Transfer to Zimbabwe (Redacted)

Transfer:
A single transfer of AUD$300 was sent to Zimbabwe via an ARS agency in
Nollamara, Perth W.A (see Figure 33). The transfer fee was $15 and the exchange
rate was 1:1. The transfer was instant and primary photo identification was required
to make the transaction. Details recorded by ARS staff include the passport number,
address, as well as first and last name. No receipt was given for the transaction.
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Figure 34. Second Set: Receipt in Zimbabwe

Receipt:
The money arrived in Harare, Zimbabwe the next day. A text message was
used to alert the owner of funds ready to be picked up (see Figure 34). A total of
USD $300 was delivered and primary photo identification was required at pick-up. A
national Identity card was used to as valid identification. Unfortunately, the money
could not return via informal funds transfer to Australia. This is because the only
money transfers allowed out of Zimbabwe are formalised banking transfers such as
telegraphic transfers.
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5.5.6 Third Set: To and From Pakistan
Figure 35. Third Set: Australia to Pakistan (Redacted)

Transfer Only:
The first transfer to Pakistan was made through a money transfer business in
Victoria Park, Perth Western Australia (see Figure 35). A total of AUD $620.00 was
sent using a Western Union gold card along with an Australian Divers License. The
gold card allows customers to streamline their transfer time by recording details of
repeat recipients reducing the amount of detail required to be written out on each
transfer sheet (Western Union, 2012). In addition, the service is free, is capable of
storing a large number of recipients details, and holds the customers personal details
as sighted from their identification when signing up for the membership (ibid). The
transfer cost AUD $15.00 and a three dollar fee was charged for a message to be
sent with the transfer. The exchange rate at the transfer agency was 96.6:1 and the
payout in Pakistan Rupee (Rp) was 58,159.68. The receipt included complete
details of the customer’s identification details, the name of the intended recipient, as
well as terms conditions of the transfer concerning exchange rate and other topics.
The receipt was signed by the agent but not by the customer, and has a section for
test questions and noting whether the receiver will have valid identification. The test
section was not filled out except for a ‘Yes’ indication on the valid identification of the
receiver question.
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Figure 36. Third Set: Pakistan to Australia (Redacted)

Transfer Only:
The second transfer was made in a money transfer agency two days after the
first transfer (Figure 36). The transaction came to the total of 2,600 Rp which
converted to AUD $19.89 at the rate of 0.0099437:1. The transfer cost 600Rp and
was validated by National Identification Card details which, according to the
international volunteers’ remarks, was not taken by sighting the card instead the
number and expiry date was given to the agent verbally. The key detail of the
receipt were the name and address of the sender, a consignment number (MTCN),
operator identification number, and the receivers name. This receipt has a question
as to whether the receiver will have valid identification which was marked as ‘Yes’.
There was no test question section on the receipt. The same terms and conditions
are marked on the receipt indicating that the agent is part of the Western Union
network. The receipt was signed by the agent but not by the customer.
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5.5.7 Third Set: To and From Pakistan Observations
Customer details required on the ‘Australian to Pakistan’ Western Union form
were far-reaching in comparison to the returning ‘Pakistan to Australia’ form. The
‘Australia to Pakistan’ receipt required all information from a driver’s license or a
passport. This includes detail on the date of issue, expiry and date of birth, country
of birth, occupation, and purpose of the transfer. In contrast, the receipt for the
Pakistan to Australia transfer only had headings for identification type and unique
number and the expiry date. This highlights a disparity between Australia and
Pakistan with customer authentication.
The use of a Western Union Gold Card (which is designed to streamline the
transfer process) is a mechanism which could lead to non-compliance in standard
procedure. The level of customer detail held on a gold card provides an easy way to
process a transaction quickly without sighting valid identification. This system
reinforces the practice of prioritising a commercial advantage (i.e. the speed and
ease of transfers). This practice also illustrates leanings towards familial and trustbased practices in money transfers.
As a holder of a Western Union Gold Card, any customer can process an
international money transfer without the need to show identification. The Gold card
automatically generates pre-existing identification information. It would be easy for a
family member or friend to use a Gold Card, allow the remittance agent to process a
transfer, and complete the transaction without the need to validate the identification
details. This vulnerability exists even though the presenter of the card might not have
been the person whose identification details have been used from the Gold Card.
Western Union has developed this system of remittance process in order to attract
more clients who have a closer predilection towards familial and trust-based
networks. Familial and Trust networks can hinder regulatory compliance with
identification requirements.
Failure to sight identification in the process of the second transfer indicates
the persistence of informality in the remittance agency. In this case, details on valid
identification are presented as if sighted when it was not. The remitter’s actions in
asking for valid identification details without checking them is an example of how
informality persists despite a formal transfer and recording process. In both
transactions agents signed the receipt in order to validate the transfer process.
However in both cases the customer did not sign the receipt leaving it blank. This
indicates a less rigorous approach to the recording of transfer details in both
transactions.

5.6 PHASE THREE CONCLUSIONS
The phase three data results highlight trends in international money transfers.
The first set of transfers show a very low level of customer identification. Transfers
are usually conducted with no identification requirements at all, whereas upon
receiving funds an ARS agent will usually make a record of the receivers name and
phone number. Outgoing customer identification standards across the international
transactions were extremely low.
When money was transferred back into Australia from Dubai the identification
requirement increased. The same informal remittance agent who had facilitated an
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anonymous transfer to Kenya required a primary photo identification check for
receiving funds just a few days later. This is significant because facilitating an
anonymous transaction out of Australia is just as unlawful as receiving and
distributing anonymous funds into Australia.
The disparity between other
transactions where identification requirements have been non-existent, and the very
last receipt of funds indicates an inconsistency in compliance with AML/CTF
regulations.
The Pakistan transfers show an inconsistency in customer identification
requisites between nations. The ‘Australia to Pakistan’ Western Union receipt
recorded extensive customer detail whereas the return transfer from Pakistan did
not. The Western Union Gold Card is a mechanism designed to streamline the
transfer process. Gold Cards can sidestep identification authentication. Transfers
from Pakistan to Australia tend to be more informal. This is illustrated by the formal
recording and transfer process expected on the receipt, yet undermined by the
agents’ verbal verification of the National Identity number and expiry date. The
validation ignores the required identification process yet is passed off as sighted and
verified by the remittance agent. Such an action cannot be distinguished due to the
lack of detail required by the form. In addition, both receipts were signed by the
transfer agent but not by the customer despite the legal requirements to the contrary.
In conclusion, the results extracted from the data indicate the informal nature
of traditional systems in international alternative remittances. There was a lack of
customer identification across the entirety of the first set of transfers, with the
exception of the last receipt of funds into Australia. There is an inconsistency
between information from different transfer origins, as well as the use of Western
Union Gold Cards, which promote non-compliance through operational streamlining.
The transfer agency in Pakistan also demonstrated a reliance on unclear transfer
record sheets, and the practice of only partially filling in remittance forms. These
results substantiate the conclusion that regulatory inadequacies may extend beyond
international borders, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send
untraceable money to and from Australia.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
There are inconsistencies in the adherence to AML/CTF legislation between
remittance agencies in Australia. This thesis hypothesised that informal remittance
agents (in particular those providing alternate remittance systems) would be
prepared to ignore or avoid some of the identification requirements for an
international money transfer.
A trend towards loose regulatory control, characterised by a lack of cultural
awareness, and informal regulatory practices, has increased the risk of criminal
exploitation. There is widespread partial obscurity of the identification of persons
engaged in sending and receiving money across international borders. The primary
outcomes of this research have found that money transfer agencies face eight
significant barriers to compliance with Australia’s anti-money laundering regulations.
Analysis of data collection results found that over half of remittance staff in
one sample exhibited non-compliance with identification requirements under antimoney laundering regulations. Furthermore, analysis of a separate data set
revealed an overall lack of customer identification requirements in money transfer
processes, which extend beyond national borders. This chapter explains the
implementation and limitations of this study, looks at future research, and answers
the secondary and principal outcomes of this study. Recommendations are provided
based on the outcomes of the research.

6.2 IMPLEMENTATION AND LIMITATIONS
Overall, the design and implementation of this research project developed
well with few complications. The project was referred to a higher level of ethical
clearance in order to satisfy aspects of deception within the study, specifically the
transfer of money with the expectation that remittance agents would ignore
identification compliance. This was due to the testing of legislative compliance as if
the researcher was a customer for data collection, and the possibility of exposing
criminal activity as a result.
Ethical clearance was obtained under the National Statement on Ethical
Conduct of Human Research (Government, 2007 a). Data collection involved
relatively small sets of transactional information owing to limitations in terms of the
location and identification of suitable informal remittance agencies. Further
limitations included the need for sizeable monetary outlay (more than $300) on the
part of the researcher to complete a set of international money transfers.
Subsequently there was a limited sample size of the phase three data set. A larger
sample was obtained for the phase two data set with 88 initial remittance samples
reducing to a phase two sample of 50 remittance agencies. The limitation of external
validity is also applicable to this research project, thus further research in this area of
study is required in order to test the conclusions and recommendations drawn from
the data.
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6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH
Australia’s alternative remittance sector is comparatively open to greater
exploitation than the formal banking sector. The sector is characterised by a set of
barriers and limitations that drive many of its industry stakeholders to resort to
reduced compliance with identity regulations. It suffers from a lack of
professionalism, certification, and industry representation. A future research project
may seek to test the viability of peak body representation as a mechanism for
professional development, and appropriate regulation in the alternative remittance
sector.

6.4 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
6.4.1 Supporting Research Question
What are the significant barriers to legislative adherence in ARS?
The results of the phase one literature review highlight eight barriers to
compliance in Australia’s alternative remittance industry. These barriers are detailed
in order of significance;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures
Limitation of Knowledge and Understanding
Allure of Large Profits
Time, Money and the Lack of Resources
Prioritisation of Commercial Imperative
Trust and Familial Networks
Informal Legacy
Informal Environment

These eight barriers are influenced by the impact of the first barrier; Culturally
Insensitive Regulatory Measures. The second, fourth, and fifth barriers are
influenced by Australia’s overly prescriptive anti-money laundering regulations. The
remaining barriers are amplified by cultural factors. The significance of all eight
barriers lies in their aggregated impact, resulting in a culture of regulatory
compliance.
A number of other key issues underline the existence of barriers to AML/CTF
compliance, especially with regard to customer identification. Money transfer agents
face a significant barrier in terms of their limited understanding of what is necessary
to achieve compliance under Australian law. In addition the money transfer sector is
at a disadvantage from bureaucratic and criminal expectations, with the allure of
criminal profits made more significant by overbearing and uninformed regulations.
Alternative remittance agencies lack the necessary resources to achieve
compliance under AML/CTF regulations. As such the allure of unregulated operation
is amplified, and this represents a significant threat to Australia’s national security. A
money transfer agent’s commercial needs can overshadow the need for compliance,
particularly where the sale of primary services is likely to take priority over the
practice of sighting, verifying and authenticating identification.
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Customer trust relationships were informal, and in such instances familiarity
between agent and customer became relaxed. The opportunity to side-step
regulatory control was also highlighted. As well as the fact that the informal
environment of remittance agencies challenges AML/CTF compliance through a
shared focus on unrelated sales and services.
In conclusion, the result derived from the review of the literatures found that
the first barrier to compliance is the most influential of all eight barriers. This is
predominantly because the AML/CTF regulations imposed on remittance agencies
are derived from a ‘Western’ perspective. Traditional Western banking systems are
not sensitive to the cultural factors which explain the persistent trend of reliance on
informal systems. They view informal transfers as less valuable than certified bank
transfers and telegraphic transfers. Therefore affecting change in the design of
regulation imposed on Australia’s alternative remittance sector is the key to inhibiting
the influence of the eight barriers on the state of compliance in the money transfer
industry.

6.4.2 Principal Research Question
To what extent are alternative remittance agencies upholding customer
identification standards when transferring and receiving funds?
The data collected from fifty (n=50) alternative remittance agencies highlights
a 52% state of non-compliance with customer identification standards. A total of
46% of remittance agencies were willing to accept student identification, and a
further 6% did not require identification to make a transaction. The other data set
showed a lack of customer identification in international money transfer agencies.
This data set also highlights the persistence of informality and irregularity in systems
which have formalised recording and transfer processes, and the use of mechanisms
which promote non-compliance (the Western Union Gold Card). The sample of
international transactions also highlighted the non-conforming manner that informal
transfer services operate. These results infer that regulatory inadequacies may
extend beyond the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send
untraceable money to and from Australia.
The threat of money laundering through the Western Union systems attached
to Australia Post outlets is high. Over 70% of Licensed Post Offices and 66% of
franchise staff expressed a willingness to accept student identification in lieu of a
primary identification document (i.e.: Passport, drivers licence). A total of 31.5% of
independent agents were willing to accept student identification, and 15.7% of the
sample did not require identification to make a transaction. In contrast the 90% state
of compliance, in flight centre affiliated travel agencies, supports the assertion that
Australia's travel industry benefits from characteristics which make compliance with
anti-money laundering regulations easier to achieve.

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 79

6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this study address the issue of whether the internationally
recommended approach to regulating alternative remittance industries is a valid one.
In conducting this research, a significant trend of non-compliance with identification
requirements set out in Australian legislation was identified. In order to respond to
this security threat the following recommendations are put forward for AUSTRAC
and the community of wider stakeholder’s benefit:
a) The structure of remittance regulation needs to be revisited.
i.
Any attempt to review Australia's AML/CTF regulations on the alternative
remittance sector should be conducted in consultation with the alternative
remittance community.
b) There is a need to address the lack of training and educational resources
available to non-finance based Regulated Entities.
c) Address the lack of representation by a Peak Body in Australia’s ARS
industry.
i.
An investigation should be conducted into the viability of developing a
peak body to represent members of the ARS community in industry.
d) AUSTRAC should recognise the need to treat enterprise in the non-core
remittance industry differently to business in which finance is the core
function.
Failure to address these issues will result in a persistent increase of high risk unregulated remittance activity, and criminal exploitation in Australia’s ARS sector.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS
The mainstream state of non-compliance in Australia’s alternative remittance
community infers a low level of effectiveness in the anti-money laundering system.
This implication represents a state of weakness in Australia’s national security
framework. From the conclusion of Australia’s last mutual evaluation in 2005,
followed by the AML/CTF Act 2006, Australia’s anti-money laundering system has
advanced by gradually imposing costly and increasingly demanding regulations on
the remittance sector. This ‘enforcement’ style of regulation has led to the
prominence of eight significant barriers to compliance. The most significant of these
eight barriers are;
1. Culturally Inappropriate Regulatory Measures, which refers to the design of
Australia’s anti-money laundering system which is based on international
standards instead of socio-cultural factors, and consultation with the ARS
sector.
2. The limitation of understanding and knowledge, which limits effective training
of agency staff and the accurate application of risk management.
3. The prioritisation of commercial imperative over compliance processes; or the
likelihood that the effective sale of primary services will take precedence over
Australia’s highly complex and costly regulations.
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4. The allure of large profits, which refers to the increased appeal of highly
profitable criminal activity when faced with highly complex and costly
regulations.
These barriers stand as influential motivators for ARS agents to avoid regulatory
measures, or move their transfer service underground. Moreover, these barriers are
amplified by the negative impact of the first and most significant barrier; Culturally
Insensitive Regulatory Measures. Therefore changes need to be made to Australia’s
AML/CTF regulatory system using an awareness of the underlying social and cultural
factors which resonate with the persistence of alternative remittance custom.
The level of non-compliance displayed by employees in the two post office
categories contacted is likely due to; the limited knowledge and understanding
provided to staff in the form of training with regard to Western Union services. The
other likely reasons for the high level of non-compliance are the prioritisation of each
stores commercial imperative, and the informal environment within Australia Post
outlets. This is evident because Australia Post outlets are licensed to provide over
100 different services, including the facilitation of passport and other official
identification applications. As a result anti-money laundering compliance is inhibited
by the distraction of many other services surrounding the Western Union transfer
system.
The data on independent remitters highlights mixed results on legislative
compliance. While the compliance level in this category was higher than Australia
Post, independent remitters remain at high risk of exploitation. This is due to the
compartmentalised nature of the independent remittance sector of the ARS industry.
The data gathered from travel agencies provides a valid example of the
improvements that could be made to the regulation of the alternative remittance
sector. The advantages granted to the travel sector are the result of representation
by the peak body AFTA. The ARS industry would benefit from official representation
by a peak body like that of AFTA. Without such a body, the ARS sector is likely to
continue to decline into an even less compliant sector and undermine Australia’s
national security framework.
The results extracted from international transactions highlight the nature of
traditional operation in alternative remittance. There was a lack of customer
identification across the first set of transfers, with the exception of the last receipt of
funds into Australia. There is inconsistency of information between transfer origins,
and the use of Western Union Gold Cards, which promote non-compliance through
operational streamlining. Transfer agents also used unclear transfer record sheets,
and incomplete record keeping with partially filled transaction forms. The level of
detail withheld across the sample of international transactions showed nonconformity to the recording of customer details in alternative remittances. These
results conclude that regulatory inadequacies extend both domestically and beyond
the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send untraceable
money to and from Australia.

REFERENCES

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 81

AAP. (2007). Brothers get extra jail time for money laundering plot. National Affairs,
1(1), 1. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/brothers-getextra-jail-time-for-money-laundering-plot/2007/08/14/1186857501696.html
AFTA. (2012). About Us. AFTA's Mission Statement, 1. Retrieved September 4th,
2012, from http://www.afta.com.au/About
AFTA. (2012 a). AFTA Online. AFTA's Role in the Travel Industry, 1. Retrieved
September 4th, 2012, from
http://www.afta.com.au/AFTAsRoleintheTravelIndustry
AFTA. (2012 b). AFTA Online. Why You Need Travel Insurance, 1. Retrieved
September 4th, 2012, from
http://www.afta.com.au/WhyYouNeedTravelInsurance
AIC. (2009). Transnational Crime Brief: Charges and offences of money laundering.
(4). Canberra: Retrieved from
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tcb/1-20/tcb004.aspx
Alexander, K. (1993). The International Anti-Money-Laundering Regime: The Role of
the Financial Action Task Force. The Journal of Money Laundering Control,
4(3), 231 - 248. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb027276
APG. (2011). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2011. Methods and Trends of Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 68. Retrieved from
http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/11/APG%20Typologies%20Report%2
02011.pdf
AUSTRAC. (2006). Risk Management: A tool for small-to-medium sized businesses.
Retrieved from http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/risk_management_tool.pdf
AUSTRAC. (2007). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act
2006, Australian Government, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC), retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/industry_consultation.html
AUSTRAC. (2007 a). AUSTRAC Guidance Note: Risk Management and AML/CTF
programs. Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/risk_man_and_amlctf_programs.pdf
AUSTRAC. (2007 b). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
Rules Instrument 2007. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2007L01000/Download
AUSTRAC. (2007 c). Annual Report 2006-07. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved
from http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2008). Annual Report 2007-08. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2009). Annual Report 2008-09. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2010). Annual Report 2009-10. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2010 a). Reporting bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). Retrieved
August 21st, 2011, from http://www.austrac.gov.au/bnis.html
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 82

AUSTRAC. (2011). New enrolment requirements. Retrieved September 12th, 2011,
from http://www.austrac.gov.au/new_enrol_req.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 a). Contact Us. Retrieved October 25th, 2011, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/contact_us.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 b). Enforceable Undertakings. Retrieved October 26th, 2011, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforceable_undertakings.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 c). Remedial Directions. Retrieved October 26th, 2011, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/remedial_directions.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 d). Removal from Register of Providers of Designated Remittance
Services. Retrieved October 26th, 2011, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/rrpds.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 e). Written Notices. Retrieved October 26th, 2011, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/written_notices.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 f). Businesses reminded to lodge their 2010 compliance reports.
Retrieved October 27th, 2011, from http://www.austrac.gov.au/17-feb11.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 g). Money Laundering in Australia. Chatswood: AUSTRAC.
Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/money_laundering_in_australia_2011.html
AUSTRAC. (2011 h). Annual Report 2010-11. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved
from http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2012). AML/CTF Compliance Reports. Retrieved July 10th, 2012, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/amlctf_compliance_report.html
AUSTRAC. (2012 a). Typologies Report 2012. Chatswood: AUSTRAC. Retrieved
from http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/typ_rprt12_full.pdf
AUSTRAC. (2012 b). AUSTRAC takes fifth enforcement action in the remittance
sector since March 2012. Media Release. Retrieved August 2nd, 2012, from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/12july2012.html
AUSTRAC. (2012 c). Budget 2012-13. Canberra: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from
http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/austrac_budget_2012-13.pdf
AUSTRAC. (2012 d). Cost Recovery Impact Statement: 2012-13. Chatswood:
AUSTRAC. Retrieved from http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/cris_2012_13.pdf
Australia, C. G. (2005). The Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) Chapter 10: National
Infrastructure. (C2012C00547). Canberra: ComLaw. Retrieved from
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00547
Australia, C. G. (2011). Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988. Retrieved from
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011C00501/Download
Australia, C. G. (2012). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act
2006. (C2012C00375). Canberra: ComLaw, 169. Retrieved from
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00375/Download
Bank, W., & IMF. (2003). Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System. 69. Retrieved from http://www-

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 83

wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/05/03/0000949
46_03041904002082/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
Birk, D., Gajek, S., Grobert, F., & Sadeghi, A. R. (2007, 1-5 July). Phishing Phishers
- Observing and Tracing Organized Cybercrime. Paper presented at the
Second International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection.
Borgers, M. J. (2009). Regulating and Combating Underground Banking. Criminal
Law forum, 20, 97–111. doi: 10.1007/s10609-008-9089-2
Bowers, C. B. (2009). Hawala, money laundering, and terrorism finance: microlending as an end to illicit remittance. Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 37, 379-681.
Brown, A. (2009). Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering Law on Financial Institutions.
Legal Issues in Business, 11, 5.
Buencamino, L., & Gorbunov, S. (2002). Informal Money Transfer Systems:
Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance. DESA Discussion
Paper No. 26, 19.
Bunt, H. v. d. (2008). A case study on the misuse of hawala banking. International
Journal of Social Economics, 35(9). doi: 10.1108/03068290810896316
Choo, K. K. R. (2008). Money laundering risks of prepaid stored value cards. Trends
and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 363, 6. Retrieved from
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/361380/tandi363/view%20paper.aspx
Choo, K. K. R. (2009). Money laundering and terrorism financing risks of prepaid
cards instruments? Asian Journal of Criminology, 4(1), 11-30.
Cook, D. M., & Smith, T. (2010). The Malarkey of Money Transfers: Overlooking EBay whilst the Hawaladars are Hunted. Proceedings of the 1st Australian
Counter Terrorism Conference.
Cook, D. M., & Smith, T. (2011). The Battle for Money Transfers: The allure of PayPal
and Western Union over Familial remittance networks. Journal of Information
Warfare, 10(1), 18-36.
Cook, D. M., & Smith, T. (2011 a). Finance Fear and Family: Issues of Trust and the
links to Terrorist Funding. Proceedings of the 2nd Australia Counter Terrorism
Conference.
Congress, U. S. (2001). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism: (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act
of 2001. Washington: Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed
methods approaches (Third ed. Vol. 1): Sage Publications, Inc.
Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in
the research process: Sage Publications Ltd.
CTCED. (2011). Counter-Terrorism Committee. Security Council. Retrieved August
15th, 2012, from http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 84

Daily Mail. (2006). Fake relics sold on eBay ‘funding terrorism’. Mail Online,
Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417967/Fake-relicssold-eBay-fundingterrorism.html
Department, A. G. (2012). "Anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing."
Retrieved March 20th, 2012, from
http://www.ag.gov.au/Antimoneylaundering/Pages/default.aspx
eBay. (2011). Form 10-K Annual Report 2011, 159. Retrieved from
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/1998527344x0xS1065088-126/1065088/filing.pdf
Egmont. (2012). The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. About, 1.
Retrieved August 13th, 2012, from
http://www.egmontgroup.org/abouthttp://www.egmontgroup.org/about
Emerald-Insight. (2012). Journal of Money Laundering Control (Academic
Database). (1368-5201). Retrieved September 1st, 2012, from Emerald
Group Publishing
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=jmlc
Ez Money Express. (2012). About Us. Retrieved August 30th, 2012, from
http://www.ezmoneyexpress.com.au/about.html
FATF-GAFI. (2005). Money laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 20042005. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/8/35003256.pdf
FATF-GAFI. (2005 a). Mutual Evaluation of Australia. Mutual Evaluation Report, 1.
Retrieved August 17th, 2012, from http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/documents/meraustralia.html
FATF-GAFI. (2005 b). Mutual Evaluation of Australia. FATF Documents Australia, 1.
Retrieved August 21st, 2012, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ac/australia/
FATF-GAFI. (2009). Guidance for Money Service Businesses. Risk-Based
Approach, 53. Retrieved from http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/name,2123,en.html
FATF-GAFI. (2010). IX Special Recommendations. Retrieved from http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.ht
ml
FATF-GAFI. (2012). International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and
the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation. The FATF Recommendations.
Retrieved from http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfrecommendations2012.ht
ml
FATF-GAFI. (2012 a). Report to G20 Leaders. Los Cabos Summit, 10. Retrieved
from http://www.fatfgafi.org/documents/repository/g20supportfornewfatfrecommendations.html
FATF-GAFI. (2012 b). About Us. Retrieved July 10th, 2012, from http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 85

FATF-GAFI. (2012 c). Members and Observers. Members, Associates and
Observers of the FATF. Retrieved August 19th, 2012, from http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/
FATF-GAFI. (2012 d). European Commission. Purpose. Retrieved August 20th,
2012, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/name,3693,en.html
FATF-GAFI. (2012 e). Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).
About the GCC. Retrieved August 20th, 2012, from http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/name,3692,en.html
FATF-GAFI. (2012 f). F.A.Q. About the FATF Retrieved August 21st, 2012, from
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/membercountriesandobservers/
FATF/OECD. (2011). Financial Action Task Force. Annual Report 2010-2011, 40.
Retrieved from http://www.fatfgafi.org/documents/repository/name,3131,en.html
FinCEN. (2012). What We Do. About FinCEN 1. Retrieved August 27th, 2012, from
http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/
Findlay, M. J. (2008). Global Terror and Organised Crime: Symbiotic or
Synonymous? Asian Criminology, 3(75), 75-89.
Flight Centre. (2012). Flight Center. Travel Consultant Services, 1. Retrieved 2012,
September 4th, from http://www.flightcentre.com/
Geary, J. M. (2009). Light is the Best Antidote. Journal of Money Laundering Control,
12(3), 215-220. doi: 10.1108/13685200910973600
Government, A. (2007). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
Rules Instrument 2007. Explanatory Statement. Canberra: ComLaw
Retrieved from http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2007L01000/Download
Government, A. (2007 a). National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human
Research 2007. (1864962690). Canberra: National Health and Medical
Research Council Retrieved from
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/e72
Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in
Developing Countries. Governance, 17(4), 525-548. doi: 10.1111/j.09521895.2004.00256.x
Hammond, L. (2011). Obliged to give: Remittances and the Maintenance of
Transnational Networks between Somalis at Home and Abroad. Bildhaan: An
International Journal of Somali Studies, 10(1), 11.
Harvey, J. (2004). Compliance and reporting issues arising for financial institutions
from money laundering regulations: a preliminary cost benefit study. Journal
of Money Laundering Control, 7(4), 333-346.
Huntington, S. P. (1992). Clash of Civilizations, The. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22.
IAIS. (2012). About the IAIS. Retrieved August 13th, 2012, from
http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28
IMF. (2011). Annual Report 2011. Pursuing Equitable and Balanced Growth, 72.
Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2011/eng/index.htm
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 86

iRemit. (2011). Corporate Profile. Retrieved September 12th, 2011, from
http://www.myiremit.com/aboutus.php
Irwin, A. S. M., Choo, K. K. R., & Liu, L. (2012). Modelling of money laundering and
terrorism financing typologies. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 15(3),
316-335.
Jensen, N. (2008). Creating an Environment in Australia Hostile to Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing: A Changing role for AUSTRAC.
Macquarie Journal of Business Law, 5(93).
Jensen, N., & Png, C. A. (2011). Implementation of the FATF 40+9
Recommendations: A perspective from developing countries. Journal of
Money Laundering Control, 4(2), 110-120. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13685201111127777
Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research
paradigm whose time has come. Educational researcher, 33(7), 14-26.
Keene, S. (2007). Hawala and Related Informal Value Transfer Systems–An
Assessment in the Context of Organized Crime and Terrorist Finance: Is
There Cause for Concern? Security Journal, 20(3), 185-196.
Kochan, N. (2005). The Washing Machine: How money laundering and terrorist
financing soils us (Vol. 1). Ohio: Texere.
Levi, M., & Gilmore, W. (2003). Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise
and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? Financing
Terrorism, 87-114.
Levi, M., & Reuter, P. (2006). Money Laundering. Crime and Justice, 34(1), 289-375.
Limited, F. C. (2011). About Us Retrieved September 4th, 2012, from
http://www.flightcentrelimited.com/about/
Limited, F. C. (2011 a). Anti-Bribery and Corruption Policy. Retrieved September 4th,
2012, from http://www.flightcentrelimited.com/about/governance/anti-briberyand-corruption-policy/
Limited, F. C. (2011 b). Risk Management Policy. Retrieved September 4th, 2012,
from http://www.flightcentrelimited.com/risk-management-policy/
Limited, F. C. (2011 c). Flight Centre Limited Annual Report 2010-11. (1), 116.
Retrieved from http://www.flightcentrelimited.com/shareholderinformation/annual-reports/
Maimbo, S. M. (2003). The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: a study of the
Hawala system in Afghanistan. Retrieved from
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Tool6.13.WorldBankRepor
t-HawalaSystem/$FILE/Tool+6.13.+World+Bank+Report++Hawala+System.pdf
Maimbo, S. M., & Passas, N. (2005). The Regulation and Supervision of Informal
Funds Transfer Systems. Remittances: development impact and future
prospects, 211.
Masciandaro, D. (2005). Financial supervisory unification and financial intelligence
units. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8(4), 354-370. Retrieved from
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 87

http://ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/2358
30113?accountid=10675
Masciandaro, D., Takats, E., & Unger, B. (2007). Black Finance: The economics of
money laundering (Vol. 1). Cheltenham, U.K., Edward Elgar Publishing.
McCombie, S., & Pieprzyk, J. (2010). Winning the Phishing War: A Strategy for
Australia. Paper presented at the Second Cybercrime and Trustworthy
Computing Workshop.
Microsoft. (2012). How to recognize phishing email messages, links, or phone calls.
Retrieved August, 2nd, 2012, from http://www.microsoft.com/security/onlineprivacy/phishing-symptoms.aspx
MONEYVAL, & FATF/OECD. (2010). Money Laundering through Money Remittance
and Currency Exchange Providers. FATF Report, (1), 78. Retrieved from
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/ML%20through%20Remittance%20and%20Currency%20E
xchange%20Providers.pdf
Moore, M. (2001). Political Underdevelopment: What causes ‘bad governance’?
Public Management Review, 3(3), 385-418.
Napoleoni, L. (2004). Terror Inc: Tracing the money behind global terrorism. Penguin
Books.
NCTAUS. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUS).
Retrieved July 25th, 2012, from
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm
OICV-IOSCO. (2012). The International Organization of Securities Commissions.
About. Retrieved August 13th, 2012, from http://www.iosco.org/about/
Passas, N. (1999). Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; a
study into so-called underground banking networks. 93. Retrieved from
http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/8/Informal%20Value%20Transfer%20
Systems%20-%20Passas.pdf
Passas, N. (2003). Informal value transfer systems, terrorism and money laundering.
(208301). Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf
Passas, N. (2006). Fighting terror with error: the counter-productive regulation of
informal value transfers. Crime, law and social change, 45(4), 315-336.
Perkel, W. (2004). Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer
Systems. American Criminal Law Review, 41(83), 183-224.
Platt, V. B. (1969). The East India Company and the Madagascar Slave Trade. The
William and Mary Quarterly, 26(4), 548-577.
Post, A. (2012). A-Z Listing of Products and Services. Retrieved July 27th, 2012,
from http://auspost.com.au/products-and-services/a.html
Post, A. (2012 a). About Us. Fast Facts. Retrieved July 27th, 2012, from
http://auspost.com.au/about-us/fast-facts.html

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 88

Post, A. (2012 b). Franchise Information. Australia Post franchise opportunities.
Retrieved July 27th, 2012, from http://auspost.com.au/working-withus/franchise-information.html
Post, A. (2012 c). Sending Money Overseas. Retrieved July 27th, 2012, from
http://auspost.com.au/personal/overseas.html
Post, A. (2012 d). Licensed Post Office (LPO) Information. Australia Post licensee
opportunities. Retrieved July 27th, 2012, from http://auspost.com.au/workingwith-us/licensed-post-office-information.html
Razavy, M. (2005). Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social
phenomenon? Crime, Law & Social Change (44), 277-299.
Rees, D. (2010). Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks Posed by
Alternative Remittance in Australia. Retrieved from
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications.aspx
Reuter, P., & Truman, E.M. (2004). Chasing Dirty Money (Vol. 1). Washington D.C.:
Institute for International Economics.
Ridley, N. (2008). Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Terrorism. Policing,
2(1), 28-35.
Sachs, J. D., & McArthur, J. W. (2005). The Millennium Project: a plan for meeting
the Millennium Development Goals. Lancet, 365, 347–353. Retrieved from
http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art12121web.pdf
Sathye, M. (2008). Estimating the cost of compliance of AMLCTF for financial
institutions in Australia. Journal of Financial Crime, 15(4), 347-363.
Schott, P. A. (2006). Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism. Supplement on Special Recommendation IX, 292.
Retrieved from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/3965111146581427871/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf
Sharma, D. (2006). Historical traces of Hundi, socio-cultural understanding, and
criminal abuses of Hawala. International Criminal Justice Review, 16(2), 99121.
Shehu, A. Y. (2004). The Asian alternative remittance systems and money
laundering. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 7(2), 175-185.
Smith, K. (2011). Father of ex-Nogales mayor sentenced in money laundering case
Retrieved August 29th, 2012, from
http://azstarnet.com/news/local/crime/father-of-ex-nogales-mayor-sentencedin-money-laundering-case/article_6f4d8da0-040b-11e1-9129001cc4c03286.html
Smith, R. D. (2008). Process and performance-based regulation: challenges for
regulatory governance and regulatory reform. Minding the Gap, 89.
Soma, J. T., Nichols, M. M., Rynerson, S. D., & Maish, L. A. (2004). Balance of
Privacy vs. Security: A Historical Perspective of the USA Patriot Act. Rutgers
Computer & Tech. LJ, 31, 285.

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 89

Stessens, G. (2000). Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement
Model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 15, 488.
Retrieved from http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99056427.pdf
Stewart, C., & Maley, P. (2012). Who's funding the people-smugglers? National
Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/whosfunding-the-people-smugglers/story-fn59niix-1226442561988
Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2012). Trade-based money laundering: Risks and
regulatory responses. Canberra: Retrieved from
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/0/3/%7BA03716CB-BFD3-46B3-93EC66FD9D9029A7%7Drpp115.pdf
Tchankova, L. (2002). Risk Identification- Basic Stage in Risk Management.
Environmental Management and Health, 13(3), 290-297.
UAE Exchange Australia. (2012). About Us. Retrieved August 30th, 2012, from
http://www.aus-uaeexchange.com/AUS/jsp/index.jsp?hid_status=8
United Nations. (2012). Governance. Retrieved July 19th, 2012, from
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/
UNODC. (2012). New UNODC campaign highlights transnational organized crime as
a US$870 billion a year business. Retrieved July 25th, 2012, from
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/July/new-unodc-campaignhighlights-transnational-organized-crime-as-an-us-870-billion-a-yearbusiness.html?ref=fs3
UNODC. (2012 a). UNODC on money-laundering and countering the financing of
terrorism. GPML Mandate, 2. Retrieved from
http://www.unodc.org/documents/money-laundering/GPML-Mandate.pdf
UNODC. (2012 b). Technical assistance against money-laundering. Retrieved
August 15th, 2012 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/moneylaundering/technical-assistance.html
Verhage, A. (2010). The holy grail of money laundering statistics: input and outcome
of the Belgian AML system. In P. van Duyne, G. Antonopolous, J. Harvey, A.
Maljevic, T. Vander Beken & K. von Lampe (Eds.), Cross-border crime
inroads on integrity in Europe (pp. 143-168). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
Verhage, A. (2010 a). The anti money laundering complex on a crime control
continuum: perceptions of risk, power and efficacy. EU and International
Crime Control: Topical Issues (Governance of Security) Research Paper
Series, (Vol. 4), 4, 143.
Walters, J., Budd, C., Smith, R. G., Choo, K. K. R., McCusker, R., & Rees, D. (2011).
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing across the globe: a
comparative study of regulatory action. Research and Public Policy Series,
1(113), 119.
Western Union (2010). Western Union Australia, 2009-2010 Annual Report,
Retrieved September 12th, 2011, from
http://ir.westernunion.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=203395&p=irol-reportsannual
Western Union. (2012). Australia: Western Union Gold Card. Want a quick and easy
way to send a money transfer? Retrieved September 7th, 2012, from
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 90

http://www.westernunion.com.au/WUCOMWEB/staticMid.do?method=load&c
ountryCode=AU&languageCode=en&pagename=osGoldCard_MoreInfo&src=
auPostGoldCard

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 91

APPENDICES
Appendix (A). International Transfer Sheet Page 1

Smith, T.J.O. 10105152

Honours Thesis

Page 92

Appendix (B). International Transfer Sheet Page 2

Appendix (C). Community Newspapers Accessed to Find Local ARS Agents
Reference

Community Newspapers
Indian Link

Edition: April 2012 Vol.2 No.11

Oriental Post

Edition: 01/06/2012 ISSN: 1447-9176

Australia Asia Business Weekly

Edition: 07/06/2012 ISSN: 1836-1234

Oriental Leisure & Living

Edition: 08/06/2012 ISSN: 1447-9176

Australian Migration Times

Edition: 25/05/2012 Vol. 77

Australian Chinese Times

Edition: 13/06/2012 ISSN: 710

The Epoch Times Perth Edition
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